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Part I: The European Union Export Control 
Regime of Arms  
 
 
Introductive Remark:  
The common position is an intergovernmental cooperation instrument set up by Article 25 of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU). It has to be implemented,by Member States into their national 
legislations. 
A common position or action is not EU law as for example a regulation or a directive. Therefore 
an implementation thereof by a Member State cannot be considered by the Commission, neither 
an inappropriate transposition can be examined by the EU Court of Justice.
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Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of December 2008 
defining common rules governing control of export of military 
technology and equipment 
Official Journal L 335/99, 13/12/2008 P. 0099 - 00103 
 
Comment: In 1998 the Council reached political agreement on the EU Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports. The Code lays down common criteria for arms exports initially adopted in 
1991 as well as so-called no-undercut principle that entails closer cooperation in managing 
‘essentially identical’ transactions. Moreover it includes a denial notification and consultation 
mechanism.  
 
In December 2008, the Council has adopted the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining 
common rules governing control of export of military technology and equipment which 
replaces the Code of Conduct. The Common Position has larger scope of application (i.e. 
brokering activities, transit, intangible transfers) and according to article 29 TEU is legally 
binding for Member States. However, the legally binding force of the Common Position 
remains uncertain bearing in mind that the EU Court of Justice has no jurisdiction over the 
CFSP issues.  
 
It shall be noted that several non-EU countries have officially aligned themselves with the 
criteria and principles of the Code (i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland and Norway). 
 
It should be noted that since a few years the COARM endeavours to establish a transparent 
and confidence-building dialogue with the European Parliament. Hence according to the 
agreement reached in December 2005 each Presidency should meet the Security and Defence 
Sub-Committee of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee to brief the Sub-
Committee on COARM activities.   
   
Moreover according to Article 13 the User’s Guide1 was adopted by the Council to help 
Member States’ Authorities to apply the Common Position. The User’s Guide is subject to 
annual revision. Thus essential interpretation elements introduced in 2009 have been 
summarised and integrated in comment and remark sections of this paper. 
 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty of the European Union, and in particular Article 15 thereof, 
Whereas: 
(1) Member States intend to build on the Common Criteria agreed at the Luxembourg and 
Lisbon European Councils in 1991 and 1992, and on the European Union Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports adopted by the Council in 1998. 
(2) Member States recognise the special responsibility of military technology and equipment 
exporting States. 
(3) Member States are determined to set high common standards which shall be regarded as 
the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, transfers of military technology and 
                                                
1  User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the 
control of exports of military technology and equipment is available at the following website: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st09/st09241.en09.pdf.  
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equipment by all Member States, and to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with 
a view to achieving greater transparency. 
(4) Member States are determined to prevent the export of military technology and equipment 
which might be used for internal repression or international aggression or contribute to 
regional instability. 
(5) Member States intend to reinforce cooperation and to promote convergence in the field of 
exports of military technology and equipment within the framework of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). 
(6) Complementary measures have been taken against illicit transfers, in the form of the EU 
Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms. 
(7) The Council adopted on 12 July 2002 Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP on the European 
Union’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms 
and light weapons. 
(8) The Council adopted on 23 June 2003 Common Position 2003/468/CFSP on the control of 
arms brokering. 
(9) The European Council adopted in December 2003 a strategy against the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, and in December 2005 a strategy to combat illicit accumulation 
and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, which imply an increased common interest of 
Member States of the European Union in a coordinated approach to the control of exports of 
military technology and equipment. 
 
Complementary information: These Strategies implement the requirements prescribed, on 
the one hand, by the United Nations Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate 
the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects2 and, on the other hand, by 
the European Security Strategy (ESS)3. 
 
European Security Strategy “A secure Europe in a better world” was adopted by the 
European Council on 12 December 2003. The ESS enunciates five key threats to be faced by 
the EU Member States, inter alia, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. It should be emphasised that the 
WMD proliferation is considered as a main challenge for the EU security and wellbeing. The 
ESS accentuates that remaining threats are highly influenced by the outcomes of illicit 
circulation, transfer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their 
excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread. 
 
It shall be noted that the definition of SALW adopted by both Strategies stems from the 
Annex of Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP4 which is following:  
“The Joint Action shall apply to the following categories of weapons, while not prejudging 
any future internationally agreed definition of small arms and light weapons. These 
categories may be subject to further clarification, and may be reviewed in the light of any 
such future internationally agreed definition. 
(a) Small arms and accessories specially designed for military use: 
                                                
2  This Program was adopted on 20 July 2000 during the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Traffic 
in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which was held on 9-20 July 2001 at UN Headquarters in 
New York. The Program is available at the following website: http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/poahtml.aspx.  
3  ESS is available on the following website:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 
4  See Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002 on the European Union’s contribution to 
combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and repealing Joint Action 
1999/34/CFSP (OJ L 191, 19.7.2002, p. 1). 
                                                                                    Preamble   
Page5 of 95 
 
— machine-guns (including heavy machine-guns), 
— sub-machine guns, including machine pistols, 
— fully automatic rifles, 
— semi-automatic rifles, if developed and/or introduced as a model for an armed force, 
— moderators (silencers). 
(b) Man or crew-portable light weapons: 
— cannon (including automatic cannon), howitzers and mortars of less than 100 mm calibre, 
— grenade launchers, 
— anti-tank weapons, recoilless guns (shoulder-fired rockets), 
— anti-tank missiles and launchers, 
— anti-aircraft missiles/man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS).”  
 
EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction5 (EU WMD Strategy) 
was adopted by the European Council on 10 December 2003. The main purpose of this 
Strategy is to develop an exhaustive and comprehensive EU plan to combat the proliferation 
of WMD and missiles capable of delivering such weapons. In order to do so three factors are 
emphasised:  
   -  Growing threat to international peace and security caused by proliferation of WMD and     
      its means of delivery; 
   -  EU must elaborate an effective multilateral response;  
   -  Instruments to prevent, deter, halt and eliminate proliferation programmes. 
EU WMD Strategy implemented in “living action plan” which must be constantly monitored, 
revised and updated every six months. This plan is based on four pillars:  
   -  Resolute action against proliferation;  
   -  Promotion of stable international and regional environment;  
   -  Close cooperation with the United States and other key partners; 
   -  Development of the necessary structures within the Union which consists in organising a  
      six monthly debate on the implementation of the EU Strategy at the External Relations  
      Council6; setting up of a WMD monitoring centre which will supervise the consistent  
      implementation of the EU7. 
 
 
New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and their delivery systems8 were adopted by the European Council on 
17 December 2008. This document constitutes an instrument intended to improve the 
efficiency of implementation of the EU WMD Strategy.  
New lines emphasise following objectives for the EU: 
   -  Rising of non-proliferation measures into a transversal priority of EU and Member States’ 
      policies; 
   -  Encouraging of existing best practices at the level of Member States' national policies; 
                                                
5  The full text of EU WMD Strategy is available at following website:  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st15/st15708.en03.pdf.  
6  Six-monthly Progress Reports are available at the following website:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=718&lang=en.   
7  A concept paper on monitoring and enhancing consistent implementation of the EU strategy against the 
proliferation of WMD adopted by European Council on 12 December 2006 frames principal task of WMD 
Monitoring Centre. This concept paper is available at the following website:  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st16/st16694.en06.pdf.  
8  The full text is available on the following website:  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17172.en08.pdf.  
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   -  Encouraging better coordination between national policies of Member States and of  
      existing EU tools and policies;  
   -  Identification of areas where EU action shall be straightened.  
 
The essential grounds of the action plan could be summed up as follows:  
   -  An updated risk and threat evaluation document;   
   -  Models for awareness raising for undertakings, scientific and academic circles, and  
      financial institutions;  
   -  Intensifying cooperation with third countries to help them to improve their non- 
      proliferation policies and export controls;  
   -  Measures to combat intangible transfers of knowledge and know-how, including  
      mechanisms of cooperation in terms of consular vigilance;  
   -  Intensifying efforts to impede proliferation flows and sanction acts of proliferation;  
   -  Intensifying efforts to combat proliferation financing;  
   -  Intensifying coordination/collaboration with, and contribution to, relevant regional and  
      international organisations. 
 
 
Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and Their 
Ammunition9 (EU SALW Strategy) was adopted by the European Council on 15-16 
December 2005. This Strategy represents EU attempt to combat the dangers stemming from 
the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition.  
EU SALW Strategy underlines that the destabilising accumulation and spread of SALW 
constitutes a growing threat to peace, security and development. It also reminds EU armoury 
of measures which are essentially represented by the Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP as well as 
various CFSP and ESDP instruments.  
Action Plan 
Action Plan constitutes the main achievement of EU SALW Strategy; it must be constantly 
monitored and revised in terms of an interim report on its implementation provided by the 
Presidency. This plan contains following means of action: 
   -  International action (support of ratification of international instruments aimed at 
combating illicit trafficking or at tracing and marking of SALW); 
   -  Regional action (support of regional initiatives, notably ECOWAS Moratorium, Nairobi 
Convention and SADC Protocol); 
   -  Action in the framework of agreements/structured dialogues (integration of SALW 
subject in the neighbourhood policy, in EU structured dialogues with main exporters); 
   -  Action within the Union (Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP, EU’s 2003 Common Position on 
brokerage, and harmonised application of the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports). 
 
(10) The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was adopted in 2001. 
(11) The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was established in 1992. 
 
Complementary information: The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms 
(UNROCA) is one of the essential mechanisms to strengthen the transparency of international 
arms transfers. It was established by the UN General Assembly Resolution 46/36L, 6 Dec. 
                                                
9  EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition is available 
at the following website: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st05/st05319.en06.pdf. 
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1991 to “to prevent the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms […] in order to 
promote stability and strengthen regional or international peace and security”. 
 
Thus the States are inviter to report on annual basis on the import and export of seven 
categories of major conventional weapons: 
   - battle tanks; 
   - armoured combat vehicles; 
   - large calibre artillery systems; 
   - military aircraft/unmanned aerial vehicles; 
   - military and attack helicopters; 
   - warships;  
   - missiles and missile systems; and 
   - small arms and light weapons – man-portable weapons made or modified to military 
specification for use as lethal instruments of war (since 2003).  
 
Information to be provided includes quantity and type of weapons as well as 
exporting/importing state. States might also submit a description of the item, additional 
comments on the transfer and background10. 
 
(12) States have a right to transfer the means of self-defence, consistent with the right of self-
defence recognised by the UN Charter. 
(13) The wish of Member States to maintain a defence industry as part of their industrial base 
as well as their defence effort is acknowledged. 
 
Complementary information: Up until 2009 the European defence marked was 
characterised by diversity of national legislations that strongly hindered the supply between 
Member States. Moreover, national licensing systems often made no distinction between 
exports to third countries and transfers to Member States.  
 
Therefore the Directive 2009/43/EC concerning transfers of defence-related products within 
the EU11 constitutes a progress towards a completion of EU market for defence technology 
and equipment while preserving Member States’ essential security interests.  
 
Article 4 establishes the main principle of the Directive according to which transfers of 
defence-related products between Member States should be subject to prior authorisation and 
that no supplementary authorisation should be required for passage through or for entrance 
onto the territory of other Member State. 
 
Article 9 introduces a certification of defence undertakings in the EU. Certification is granted 
by national competent authorities and has to be mutually recognised. It attests the reliability 
of the recipient undertaking, more precisely its capacity to observe export limitations of 
defence-related products received from another Member State under a transfer licence and 
incorporated in another defence-related product or, if necessary, prevent by other means such 
products from leaving the EU.  
 
                                                
10   For complementary information see the website of UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA): 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/HTML/RegisterIndex.shtml.  
11  Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms 
and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 1). 
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In addition, the Directive sets up different types of transfer licences (i.e. general, global and 
individual) as well as provisions on information exchange.  
  
Member States will have to implement the Directive 2009/43/EC by 30 June 2011 at the latest 
and apply those measures from 30 June 2012. 
 
 
(14) The strengthening of a European defence technological and industrial base, which 
contributes to the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular 
the Common European Security and Defence Policy, should be accompanied by cooperation 
and convergence in the field of military technology and equipment. 
(15) Member States intend to strengthen the European Union’s export control policy for 
military technology and equipment through the adoption of this Common Position, which 
updates and replaces the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the 
Council on 8 June 1998. 
(16) On 13 June 2000, the Council adopted the Common Military List of the European Union, 
which is regularly reviewed, taking into account, where appropriate, similar national and 
international lists. 
(17) The Union must ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context 
of its external relations, in accordance with Article 3, second paragraph of the Treaty; in this 
respect the Council takes note of the Commission proposal to amend Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of 
dual use items and technology, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS COMMON POSITION: 
 
Article 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Common Position  
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Article 1 
1. Each Member State shall assess the export licence applications made to it for items on the 
EU Common Military List mentioned in Article 12 on a case-by-case basis against the criteria 
of Article 2. 
 
Comment: According to User’s Guide the export licence is a formal authorisation issued by 
the national licensing authority to export or transfer military equipment on a temporary or 
definitive basis. Export licences include: 
  - licences for physical exports, including where these are for purpose of licensed  
    production of military equipment; 
  - brokering licences; 
  - transit or transhipment licences; 
  - licences for any intangible transfers of software and technology by means such as  
    electronic media, fax or telephone (See point 2.5.4). 
 
In other words, with regard to the issue of defence technology and equipment, the concept of 
“export licence” covers both intra- and extra- EU transfers. Therefore an authorisation will be 
necessary to export an military item to another EU Member State or to a third country.  Hence 
the defence trade remains largely within the competence of Member States even if a few 
initiatives have been initiated to establish the EU defence market (See comment on Recital 
13).  
 
Data on export licences and refusals per destination, per region and worldwide is available in 
the Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment 
which is published in the ‘C’ series of the Official Journal of the European Union. (See also 
comment on Article 8(2). 
 
The Eleventh Annual report was published in Official Journal of the EU (OJ C 9, 13.1.2011, 
p. 1). In order to see the dynamic of EU military export, the summary of the data provided is 
following:   
  - Central America and the Caribbean 273 licences and 13 refusals, 
  - Central Asia 234 licences and 6 refusals; 
  - European Union 19 080 licences, no information on refusals; 
  - Middle East 6 002 licences and 80 refusals; 
  - North Africa 792 licences and 15 refusals; 
  - North America 8 386 licences and 1 refusal; 
  - North East Asia 3 080 licences and 55 refusals; 
  - Oceania 2 390 licences, no information on refusals; 
  - Other European Countries 8 284 licences and 105 refusals; 
  - South America 1 713 licences and 24 refusals; 
  - South Asia 4 520 licences and 80 refusals; 
  - South East Asia 3 322 licences and 44 refusals; 
  - Sub-Saharan Africa 1 937 licences and 54 refusals; 
  - Worldwide 62 482 licences and 408 refusals. 
 
The information on brokering licenses granted and denied per Member State is also accessible 
through the Annual Report. It contains separate tables for each Member State including data 
on destination, number of licences issued, the value of licences issued in Euros, ML category, 
quantity of brokered items and country of origin.  
Article 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Common Position  
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In 2009, 9 brokering licences were refused by: 
  - Bulgaria (Cuba, ML 11, Criteria 2, 3 and 8); 
  - UK (Cameroon, ML 3a; Honduras ML 1a; Guatemala, ML 1a; Kenya; Bangladesh  
    ML 1b; Sierra Leone ML 6a); and  
  - Germany (Brazil, ML 22, Criterion 7; Russian Federation, ML 13, Criterion 7).  
 
2. The export licence applications as mentioned in paragraph 1 shall include: 
- applications for licences for physical exports, including those for the purpose of 
licensed production of military equipment in third countries, 
 
- applications for brokering licences,	  
 
Comment: According to User’s Guide brokering activities are activities of persons and 
entities:  
  - negotiating or arranging transactions that may involve the transfer of items on the  
    EU Common Military List from a third country to any other third country.  
  - who buy, sell or arrange the transfer of such items that are in their ownership from a  
    third country to any other third country (See point 2.5.3).  
 
It should be noted that before the entry into force of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
the main EU legislation for brokering issue was the Council Common Position 
2003/468/CFSP of 23 June 2003 on the control of arms brokering12. It established a frame of 
control for technical assistance where it is provided outside the EU by a natural or legal 
person established in the EU and is or might be intended for the WMD-related or military 
end-use. Currently, several provisions of the Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP, in 
particular these on information sharing, remain applicable; however they should be read in 
light of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. Thus the COARM has agreed that the 
information sharing commitments set out in Common Position 2003/468/CFSP should be 
implemented via the mechanism laid down in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.  
 
Moreover, the Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the 
control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items13 also gives a definition of 
brokering activities. Article 2(3), paragraph 2 considers as brokering services an arrangement 
of transfer of items on the EU Common List of military equipment from a third country to any 
other third country. However, the term “arrange the transfer” was not specifically defined 
which might leave a room for manoeuvre for Member States’ appreciation or interpretation.  
 
Contrary to the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, Article 2(5) of the Regulation 428/2009 
specifies that “ancillary services” such as transportation, financial services, insurance or re-
insurance, or general advertising or promotion, are excluded from the definition of brokering 
services. Hence, a parallel can be drawn between “arrange the transfer” and “ancillary 
services”, which can potentially guide Member States in elaboration of their national 
legislations implementing the Regulation.  
 
International instruments took the initiative to control auxiliary services in other fields of 
strategic control.  
                                                
12  OJ L 156, 25.06.2003, p. 79. 
13  Council regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of 
exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (Recast) (OJ L 134, 29.05.2009, p. 1).  
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The UN General Assembly adopted on 8 December 2005 the Resolution 60/81 which 
requested Secretary General to appoint a Group of Governmental Experts in order to consider 
further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating 
illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and to submit a report on the 
outcome of its study. After numerous consultations with UN Member States, the Group of 
Experts submitted a required report emphasising a necessity to regulate activities closely 
associated with brokering in SALW14. 
As concerns EU law, ancillary services are regularly covered by Council Decisions 
implementing resolution of the UN Security Council on restrictive measures against a third 
states. These provisions do not explicitly include nor exclude brokering activities related to 
ancillary services. The Council uses more vague wording and speaks about “direct or 
indirect” supply of controlled items. As long as brokering activities consist in an indirect 
supply of items including transport and financial services, brokering of ancillary services 
could be considered as covered by these specific Council Decisions as it is, for example, the 
case for the Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures 
against Syria15: 
  
Article 1.2: “it shall not apply to: 
a) provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services or other services 
related to the items referred to in paragraph 1 or related to the provision, manufacture, 
maintenance and use of such items, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use 
in, Syria; 
b) provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the items referred 
to in paragraph 1, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any 
sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for the provision of related technical 
assistance, brokering services or other services to any natural or legal person, entity or body 
in, or for use in, Syria; 
c) participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities, the object or effect of which is to 
circumvent the prohibitions referred to in points (a) or (b).” 
 
- applications for "transit" or "transhipment" licences, 
 
Comment: “transit” and “transhipment” are not defined by this Common Position. Given 
that the distinction between these two terms is not very clear, they are sometimes used 
indifferently to qualify the same operation. Nevertheless, the User’s Guide to the EU Code of 
Conduct on Arms Export has defined the terms “transit” and “transhipment”: 
- “Transit is the movements in which the goods (military equipment) merely pass through the 
territory of the Member State”; 
- “Transhipment is a transit involving the physical operation of unloading goods from the 
importing means of transport followed by a reloading (generally) onto another exporting 
means of transport”. In this regard transhipment should be understood as a part of transit 
operation. 
 
- applications for licences for any intangible transfers of software and technology by 
means such as electronic media, fax or telephone. 
                                                
14  The report of group of Group of Governmental experts can be found at following website: 
www.grip.org/bdg/pdf/g0974.pdf  
15  Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Syria (OJ L 
121, 10.05.2011, p. 11).  
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Comment: The export authorisation for an item listed covers the minimum technology 
necessary for the installation, operation, maintenance and repair of the items supplied. It also 
provides operating instructions and some basic specifications. An everyday parallel could be a 
technical manual supplied with a television or washing machine. If such technology is 
exported apart it will require an authorisation. 
Moreover, an authorisation might also be necessary if: 
- the technology will support a complete system, but the items exported are components of 
that system; 
- the technology related to a previous authorisation, but not essentially different from the 
technology that was originally supplied (i.e. handbooks or publications concerning the 
equipment that has been upgraded since its original supply). 
 
Member States’ legislation shall indicate in which case an export licence is required with 
respect to these applications 
 
Article 2 Criterion One  
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Article 2 
1. Criterion One: Respect for the international obligations and commitments of Member 
States, in particular the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, 
agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations. 
An export licence shall be denied if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia: 
(a) the international obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce 
United Nations, European Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe arms embargoes; 
(b) the international obligations of Member States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons 
Convention; 
(c) the commitment of Member States not to export any form of anti-personnel landmine; 
(d) the commitments of Member States in the framework of the Australia Group, the 
Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic 
Missile Proliferation. 
 
Comment: According to the User’s Guide, the main purpose of Criterion 1 is to ensure that 
sanctions decided by international regimes are respected. To evaluate if an export might be 
inconsistent or not with international obligations and commitments Member States should 
firstly consult different information sources at their disposal (common EU database, EU 
denial database, EU watch list, international regimes database and others documentation 
available through United Nations, IAEA…). 
 
The User’s Guide detailed the elements (point (a) to (d) of the Criterion 1) to take into 
consideration by Member States’ Authorities while assessing the consistency of an 
application with their international obligations:  
   - To enforce the UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes. Member States should carefully 
check if the final destination and end-user are subject to these. As concerns legally binding 
UN sanctions, in order to assure unified EU interpretation of the scope of UN embargos 
Member States should refer either to the Council Common Position or to the Council 
Regulation, which incorporate such sanctions into EU law. An interpretation is left to the 
discretion of Member States for non-legally binding UN and OSCE sanctions. 
   - Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. The User’s Guide contains a short 
description of these instruments, their legal force and scope of application as well as a set of 
indicators to be taken into consideration by national authorities while assessing a licence 
application.  
   - Not to export any form of anti-personnel landmine. Member States Parties to the Ottawa 
Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines or those which have taken a political commitment not to 
export such mines should deny an export authorisation for such mines unless for purpose of 
their destruction (Poland and Finland did not ratify the Convention). 
   - In the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the 
Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the 
Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The User’s Guide contains a 
short description of these instruments, their legal force and scope of application as well as a 
set of indicators to be taken into consideration by national authorities while assessing a 
licence application.  
For complementary information see point 3.1.3 of the User’s Guide as revised in 2009. 
 
Article 2 Criterion Two  
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2. Criterion Two: Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as 
respect by that country of international humanitarian law. 
 
- Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by 
international human rights instruments, Member States shall: 
(a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment 
to be exported might be used for internal repression; 
(b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and 
taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries 
where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent 
bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe; 
 
Comment: The User’s Guide largely analyses and comments this criterion focusing on the 
respect of human rights. The following terms are defined more precisely: 
 
Recipient country’s attitude towards relevant human rights principles (as redrafted by the 
present Common Position): it includes the policy line of the government of the recipient 
State, past record of the proposed end-user, recent significant developments, including inter 
alia the impact of “fight against terrorism”; effective constitutional protection of human 
rights; human rights training among key actors (e.g. law enforcement agencies); impunity for 
human rights violations; independent monitoring bodies and national institutions for 
promotion or protection of human rights.  
The User’s Guide has adopted a list of indicators to assess the recipient country’s attitude 
toward human rights and fundamental freedoms: 
- The commitment of the recipient country’s government to respect and improve human rights  
  and to bring human rights violators to justice; 
- The implementation record of relevant international and regional human rights instruments  
  through national policy and practice;  
- The ratification record of the country in question with regard to relevant international and  
  regional human rights instruments; 
- The degree of cooperation with international and regional human rights mechanisms (e.g.  
  UN treaty bodies and special procedures); 
- The political will to discuss domestic human rights issues in a transparent manner, for  
  instance in the form of bilateral or multilateral dialogues, with the EU or with other partners  
  including civil society (See point 3.2.3 of the User’s Guide). 
 
International human rights instruments (this provision was supplemented by User’s Guide 
as revised in 2009): a non-exhaustive list of the main international and regional instruments is 
contained in the Annex II of the User’s Guide (See point 3.2.4 of the User’s Guide). 
 
The recipient country’s attitude. The following indicators should be taken into account when 
assessing a country’s respect for, and observance of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms:  
   - The commitment of the Government to respect and improve human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; 
   - The implementation record of relevant international and regional human rights instruments 
through national policy and practice; 
   - The ratification record of the country in question with regard to relevant international and 
regional human rights instruments; 
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   - The degree of cooperation with international and regional human rights mechanisms (e.g. 
UN treaty bodies and special procedures); 
   - The political will to discuss domestic human rights issues in a transparent manner with the 
EU or with other partners including civil society (See point 3.2.5 of the User’s Guide).  
 
Serious violations of human rights (this provision was supplemented by User’s Guide as 
revised in 2009): the qualification of a human rights violation as “serious” has to be assessed 
for each situation on its own merits and on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all 
relevant aspects. Relevant factor in the assessment is the character/nature and consequences of 
the violation in question. Systematic and/or widespread violations of human rights underline 
the seriousness of the human rights situation. However, violations do not have to be 
systematic or widespread in order to be considered as “serious” for the Criterion 2 analysis. 
According to Criterion 2, a major factor in the analysis is to consider whether the competent 
bodies of the UN, the EU or the Council of Europe (as listed in Annex III of the User’s 
Guide) have established that serious violations of human rights have taken place in the 
recipient country. In this respect it is not a prerequisite that these competent bodies explicitly 
use the term “serious” themselves; it is sufficient that they establish that violations have 
occurred. Member States should however assess if these violations are considered as serious 
in the present context. Likewise, a lack of decision of supranational authorities should not 
preclude Member States from the possibility to make an independent estimation as to whether 
such serious violations have occurred (See point 3.2.6 of the User’s Guide). 
 
Clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression (this provision was 
supplemented by User’s Guide as revised in 2009) 
 
Criterion gives a set of examples of what constitutes an internal repression. However, 
assessing whether or not there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used to commit 
or facilitate such acts requires a detailed analysis. The combination of “clear risk” and 
“might” should be emphasised. Such wording requires a lower burden of evidence than a 
“clear risk” that equipment will be used for internal repression.  
 
The risk analysis should be based upon a case-by-case consideration of available evidence of 
the history and current prevailing circumstances in the recipient State/regarding the proposed 
end-user, as well as any identifiable trends and/or future events that might reasonably be 
expected to precipitate conditions that might lead to repressive actions (e.g. forthcoming 
elections). Some initial questions that might be asked are:  
   - Has the behaviour of the recipient State/ the proposed end-user been highlighted  
     negatively in EU Council statements/conclusions?  
   - Have concerns been raised in recent reports from EU Heads of Mission in the recipient  
     State/regarding the proposed end-user?  
   - Have other international or regional bodies (e.g. UN, Council of Europe or OSCE) raised  
     concerns?  
   - Are there any consistent reports of concern from local or international NGOs and the  
     media?   
 
A particular weight should be given to the current situation in the recipient State before 
confirming any analysis. It may be the case that abuses have occurred in the past but that the 
recipient State has taken steps to change practices in response to domestic or international 
pressure, or an internal change in government took place. Following interrogations might be 
raised:  
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- Has the recipient State agreed to external or other independent monitoring and/or    
  investigations of alleged repressive acts?  
- If so, how has it reacted to/implemented any findings?  
- Has the government of the recipient State changed in manner that gives confidence of a  
  change in policy/practice?    
- Are there any EU or other multilateral or bilateral programmes in place aimed at bringing  
  about change/reform?  
 
Mitigating factors such as improved openness and an on-going process of dialogue to address 
human rights concerns in the recipient State may lead to the possibility of a more positive 
assessment. However, it is important to recognise that a lengthy passage of time since any 
highly publicised instance of repression in a recipient State is not on its own a reliable 
measure of the absence of clear risk. There is no substitute for up-to-date information from 
reliable data sources if a proper case-by-case assessment is to be made (See point 3.2.7 of the 
User’s Guide).  
 
The nature of the military technology or equipment: any assessment of equipment under 
Criterion 2 has to be realistic (i.e. are the items in question really useable as a tool of 
repression?). In addition, it is important to recognise that a wide variety of equipment has a 
track record of use which can eventually favour the fulfilment or facilitate repressive acts. 
Items such as Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), body armour and 
communications/surveillance equipment can have a strong role in facilitating repression 
(Point 3.2.8 of the User’s Guide).  
 
The end-user has to be carefully considered. If intended for the police or security forces, it is 
important to establish the exact branch of these forces in a recipient State thereto the items are 
to be delivered. It should also be noted that there is no strict rule as to which branches of the 
security apparatus may have a role in repression. For example, the army may have a role in 
some States, while in others it may have no record of such a role.   
Some initial questions might include:  
   - Is there a record of this equipment being used for repression in the recipient state or  
     elsewhere?  
   - If not, what is the possibility of it being used in the future?  
   - Who is the end-user?  
   - What is the end-user’s role in the recipient state?  
   - Has the end-user been involved in repression?  
   - Are there any relevant reports on such involvement? (See point 3.2.9 of the User’s Guide). 
 
For these purposes, technology or equipment which might be used for internal repression will 
include, inter alia, technology or equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or 
similar technology or equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where 
there is reason to believe that the technology or equipment will be diverted from its stated 
end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line with Article 1 of this Common 
Position, the nature of the technology or equipment will be considered carefully, particularly 
if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture 
and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary 
executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major violations of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, 
including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. 
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Comment: According to User’s Guide an assessment of the likelihood of diversion might 
include following questions:  
   - Does the stated end-user have a legitimate need for this equipment? Or are the items in  
     question more appropriate to another branch of the security apparatus?  
   - Would we issue a licence if the end-user were another part of the security apparatus of the  
     recipient state?  
   - Do the different branches of the security forces have separate procurement channels? Is  
     there a possibility that equipment might be redirected to a different branch? (See point  
     3.2.13).  
 
- Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by 
instruments of international humanitarian law, Member States shall: 
(c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or 
equipment to be exported might be used in the commission of serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. 
 
Comment: International humanitarian law (IHL) establishes a scope of rules applicable in 
times of armed conflict, which seek to protect people who are not/no longer taking part in the 
hostilities and to regulate the conduct of hostilities. The main instruments of IHL are the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols16, completed by a number of 
specific treaties (See Annex IV to Chapter 3 Section 2 of the User’s Guide). A lack of 
ratification of the IHL instruments by the recipient State along with an absence of national 
legislation required should make the national authorities more vigilant during the assessment 
of a licence application.  
 
According to User’s Guide, serious violations of international humanitarian law include 
infringements of: 
   - Four Geneva Conventions (Art. 50 GC I; Art. 51 GC II; Art. 130 GC III; Art. 147 CG 
      IV);  
   - Additional Protocol I (Art. 11 and 85); 
   - Rome Statute or the International Criminal Court (Art. 7 and 8)17.  
 
In assessing the potential serious violation of IHL in the country of final destination the 
national authorities light ask the following questions:  
   - Have violations been committed by any actor for which the State us responsible? (i.e. state 
     organs , including armed forces; persons or entities empowered to exercise elements of  
     government authority; persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions or under its  
     directions or control violations committed by private persons or groups which it  
     acknowledges and adopts as its own product).  
   - Has the recipient country failed to take action to prevent and suppress violations  
     committed by its nationals or on its territory?  
   - Has the recipient country failed to investigate violations allegedly committed by its  
     nationals on its territory? 
   - Has the recipient country failed to search ant to prosecute (or extradite) its nationals to  
                                                
16  The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols are available on the website of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView.  
17  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998 is available on the website of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/585?OpenDocument. 
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     those on tit territory responsible for violations of IHL? 
   - Has the recipient country failed to cooperate with other State, ad hoc tribunals or the  
     International Criminal Court in connections with criminal proceedings relating to  
     violations of IHL? (See point 3.2.11 of the User’s Guide). 
 
As regards clear risk the User’s Guide specifies that an assessment should comprise an 
overview of the recipient’s past and present record of respect for IHL, the recipient’s 
intentions as expressed through a formal commitments and the recipient’s capacity to ensure 
that the equipment is used in consistency with the IHL and is not diverted. It should be kept in 
mind that the isolated incident of IHL violations might not by themselves constitute a basis to 
for denial. For a list of supplementary questions see point 3.2.12 of the User’s Guide.  
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3. Criterion Three: The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function 
of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts. 
Member States shall deny an export licence for military technology or equipment which 
would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the 
country of final destination. 
 
Comment: It should be kept in mind that if there is an armed conflict or if there are internal 
tensions in the country of destination, a careful analysis should be carried out concerning the 
eventual risk that the proposed export might provoke a wider conflict. Particular attention 
should be given to the role of the end-user in this conflict.  
 
The User’s Guide establishes a list of information sources for Member States Authorities, 
such as common EU base of information (EU HOM reports, EU reports, EU Council 
statements/conclusions), EU Watchlist (destinations deserving particular vigilance) and EU 
denial database (see point 3.3.2).  
 
The User’s Guide has also defined some key concepts:  
Internal situation refers to the economic, social and political developments and stability 
within the borders of the country of final destination. The Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
also refers to the “country of final destination” as the “recipient country”.  
 
Function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts  
Tensions refers to unfriendly or hateful relations between different groups, or groups of 
individuals, of the society based either on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, interpretation of historic events, differences in 
economic wellbeing or ownership of property, sexual orientation, or other factors. Tensions 
could be at the origin of tumult or violent actions, or a cause for the creation of private militia 
not controlled by the State.  
Armed conflicts refers to the escalation of the tensions between groups to the level in which 
any of the groups uses arms against others.  
 
Moreover, the competent authority must assess the internal situation of the country of 
destination; possible participation and role of the end-user in the internal conflict or tensions 
and the probable use of the proposed export in the conflict. In assessing the potential risks in 
the recipient country the competent authority might ask the following questions:  
- What is the end-use of the proposed export (military technology or equipment)? Would the 
  export be used to enforce internal security or to continue with the hostilities?  
- Is the military equipment or technology intended to support internationally-sanctioned  
  peace- keeping/peace enforcing operations or humanitarian interventions?  
- Is the end-user participating or closely related to a party involved in the armed conflict  
  within the country? What is the role of the end-user in the conflict?   
- If components or spares are being requested, is the recipient state known to operate the  
  relevant system in armed conflict in the country?  
- Have there been recent reports that the existing tensions might be aggravating? Is there a  
  risk that the existing tensions might turn into an armed conflict when one or more of the  
  participants gain access to the military equipment and technology to be exported?  
- Is the recipient country subject to regional or UN embargoes because of the internal 
situation thereof (see also Criterion 1)?  
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The nature of equipment should be appreciated in order to see if it is related, directly or 
indirectly, to the tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination. This will be all the 
more important when there is already an existing armed conflict.  
Some questions to consider might be:  
- Is the nature of export in such, that it is or could be used in an armed conflict within the  
  country of final destination?  
- Is there a risk that the existing internal tensions might turn into an armed conflict when the  
  proposed end-user obtains access to this military equipment and technology?  
  
The end-user also plays an important role in the analysis. Therefore it is important to 
establish exactly for which branch of the armed forces, police or security forces the export is 
intended. For example, in a recipient country the army and police might be involved in an 
armed conflict in which the navy has no role. In this respect, the risk of internal diversion 
should also be considered.  
 
More complex cases arise when equipment may be going to a research institute or private 
company. Here a judgment should be made on the likelihood of diversion, and the views on 
Criterion 3 should be based on the other criteria, specifically concerns related to Criterion 7, 
the risk of diversion. 
 
The following questions might be considered:  
- What is the end-user’s role in the recipient state? Is the end-user part of the problem, or 
  rather attempting to be part of the solution?  
- Is the end-user involved in the internal armed conflict or tensions?  
- Are there any relevant reports of such involvement?  
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4. Criterion Four: Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.  
Member States shall deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient 
would use the military technology or equipment to be exported aggressively against another 
country or to assert by force a territorial claim. 
When considering these risks, EU Member States will take into account inter alia: 
a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another 
country; 
b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in 
the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force; 
c) the likelihood of the military technology or equipment being used other than for 
the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient; 
d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way. 
 
Comment: The Criterion makes a distinction between the intention to use the proposed 
export for aggressive as opposed to defensive purposes. It is not intended to preclude exports 
to countries that are (potential) victims of aggression or a threat of aggression. A careful 
assessment would need to be carried out as to whether there are sound indications of an 
intention by the intended recipient country to use the proposed export to attack, potentially 
attack or threaten to attack another country.  
  
The User’s Guide establishes a list of information sources for Member States Authorities, 
such as common EU base of information (EU HOM reports, EU reports, EU Council 
statements/conclusions), EU SitCen (Country Risk Assessment), EU Watchlist (destinations 
deserving particular vigilance) and EU denial database (see point 3.4.2).  
  
The User’s Guide has also defined some key concepts:  
Preservation of regional peace, security and stability: This criterion addresses the issue of 
whether the recipient state has intentions to use or threaten to use the proposed export 
aggressively against another country. An assessment should therefore be made of the 
recipient’s intentions, as well as whether the import is an appropriate and proportionate 
response to the recipient country’s need to defend itself, to ensure internal security, and assist 
in international peace-keeping and humanitarian operations.   
 
Licence applications to sensitive and potentially sensitive destinations are carefully assessed 
on a case-by-case basis, especially when the export destination regards a country that is or has 
been involved in armed conflict. When analysing whether there is a clear risk, the history of 
armed conflict and the current prevailing circumstances in the recipient state and the region 
should be taken into consideration, as well as any identifiable trends and/or future events that 
might reasonably be expected to heighten tensions or lead to aggressive actions.   
  
The wording shall deny (the Code of Conduct used the wording will not issue) means that if 
in the assessment of a licence application it has been established that there is a clear risk that 
the proposed export would be used aggressively against another country or to assert by force a 
territorial claim, the export licence must be denied regardless of the outcome of the analysis 
with respect to the other criteria set out in Article 2 of the Common Position, or any other 
considerations.  
  
When considering these risks, Member States will take into account inter alia:  
 (a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country  
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For the purposes of this element, a judgement will have to be made as to whether there is a 
clear risk that this equipment will be used in an existing armed conflict between the recipient 
country and its neighbours or another conflict in the region. Where there is no armed conflict, 
the regional situation should be considered. Growing tensions in the region, increased threats 
of conflict or weakly held peace arrangements are examples of whether there is a likelihood of 
a conflict, putting at risk the preservation of the regional peace, security and stability. In these 
cases, a judgement would need to be made as to whether there is a clear risk that supplying 
this piece of equipment would hasten the advent of conflict, for instance by giving the 
recipient country an advantage over its neighbours or others in the region. Where the 
equipment to be exported might add to the military capability of the recipient country, a 
judgement will have to be made as to whether there is a clear risk that this equipment will 
prolong an existing conflict or bring simmering tensions into armed conflict.  
 
The following questions are indicators that may be taken into consideration as appropriate:  
  - Is there an existing conflict in the region?  
  - Is the current situation in the region likely to lead to an armed conflict?  
  - Is the threat of conflict theoretical/unlikely or is it a clear and present risk?  
  
 (b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the 
past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force 
An assessment should be made on whether there is a clear risk that the recipient country will 
by armed conflict or threat of force assert a territorial claim on a neighbouring country. Such 
territorial claim might be stated as an official position or be voiced by official representatives 
or relevant political forces of the recipient country and could relate to land, sea or aerial 
space. The neighbouring country does not have to be the direct neighbour of the recipient 
country.  
 
When making a judgement any recent claims by the recipient country on another’s territory 
should be factored in. Where the recipient country has tried in the past to pursue by force a 
territorial claim or has threatened to pursue a territorial claim, a judgement should be made as 
to whether the nature of this equipment will let it seem probable, that it would be used in such 
a case and as to whether it would give the recipient country an additional capability to try to 
pursue again this claim by force, thus destabilising the region.  
  
The following questions are indicators that may be taken into consideration as appropriate:  
- Is the recipient country pursuing a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country?   
- Has a territorial claim led to conflict in the region, or underlying tensions between the  
  recipient country and its neighbours?  
- Has the recipient country tried to resolve the issue through peaceful means, has it tried in the  
  past to assert by force its territorial claim, or has it threatened to pursue its territorial claim  
  by force?  
  
(c) the likelihood of the military technology or equipment would be likely to being used 
other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient 
When assessing this element of Criterion 4, the exporting state should estimate whether the 
recipient state has expressed an aggressive military doctrine, and the likelihood of the 
requested equipment being used in accordance with this doctrine. The exporting state should 
also estimate whether the requested equipment is compatible with, or constitutes a necessary 
addition to or replacement of, existing armament systems in the defence forces of the 
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recipient state. It may also be relevant to take into account the quantity and quality of the 
equipment to be exported.  
  
(d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way 
A judgement on this Criterion will have to be made on whether supplying the recipient 
country with the equipment will significantly improve military capability thereof, and if it 
does, would a neighbouring country as a result be put under threat of conflict. Where there are 
existing tensions in the region, would supplying of this equipment enhance the recipient 
country’s military capability by introducing a new piece of equipment into the region which 
could threaten a neighbouring country.  
 
The following questions are indicators that may if appropriate be taken into consideration:  
- Why does the recipient wish to acquire the equipment or technology?   
- Is this equipment simply a replacement or it is destined for maintenance for existing items  
  that might be old or in disrepair, or is the recipient developing new capabilities, such as a  
  significantly improved air strike capability?  
  
The nature of the equipment should be analysed to see whether there is a clear risk that the 
equipment can be used in a conflict between the recipient country and its neighbours. This 
will be used to a greater extent where there are regional tensions or armed conflicts. Where 
tensions exist, the type of equipment is all the more important as the equipment could 
significantly increase the recipient country’s capability to move to armed conflict or threaten 
armed conflict. Could a neighbouring country be moved to increase its arms imports due the 
export of this equipment? Given tensions in certain regions, an export could be seen as an 
increase in threat to a neighbouring country; therefore consideration of this question becomes 
vital.    
Some questions to consider might be:  
- Would the recipient’s capability be enhanced by the export, and if so, would it be enhanced  
  to the point where existing powers balance would be upset? Given the circumstances in the  
  recipient country and its intentions, would an enhanced capability present a clear risk of  
  hastening the advent of conflict?   
- Would a neighbouring country feel threatened by the military technology or equipment to be  
  exported?   
- Is there a risk that the existing regional tensions might turn into an armed conflict when one  
  or more of the participants obtain access to this military equipment and technology?  
- Is the export in nature such, that it is or could be used in an armed conflict within the   
  region? What is the likelihood of this equipment being used in a conflict?  
  
A judgement on the end-user would have to be made on whether he would allow this 
equipment to be used in a manner inconsistent to Criterion 4. If it is going directly to the 
military/government, a decision has to be made on whether the equipment will be used in any 
military action against another country.  
 
More complex cases arise when equipment may be going to a research institute or private 
company. Here a judgement should be made on the likelihood of diversion, and views on 
Criterion 4 should be based on the other criteria, specifically concerns related to Criterion 7, 
and the risk of diversion.    
The following questions might be considered:  
- Is the export likely to be deployed in conflict with a neighbouring state? Or would it most  
  likely go to the Police/a UN contribution, or some other branch of the security forces not  
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  directly connected to the Criterion 4 concerns? (See point 3.4.3 of the User’s Guide). 
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5. Criterion Five: The national security of the member states and of territories whose 
external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and 
allied countries 
Member States will take into account: 
a) the potential effect of the military technology and equipment to be exported on 
their defence and security interests as well as those of Member States and those 
of friendly allied countries, while recognising that this factor cannot affect 
consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, 
security and stability; 
b) the risk of use of the military technology and equipment concerned against their 
forces or of Member States and those of friendly allied countries. 
 
Comment: The User’s Guide lays down a list of information sources relating to the national 
security of Member States and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility 
of a Member State, and to defence interests, such as UN Charter, NATO Treaty, Council of 
Europe, etc (see point 3.5.2).  
 
Unlike the other seven criteria, which draw Member States’ attention to a particular aspect of 
the country of destination deemed to be source of risk, Criterion 5 requires the Member States 
to carry out an analysis focused on a parameter specific to them: their national security an that 
of friends, allies and other Member States.  
 
User’s Guide analysis of “key concepts” of Criterion 5 could be summarised as follows: 
 
National Security refers to the capability of the Member States to ensure territorial integrity, 
protect the population and preserve national security interests as well as the resources and 
supplies deemed essential for its subsistence and its independence vis-à-vis all kind of threats 
and attacks.  
 
According the European Security Strategy, the principal EU threats include terrorism 
(religious extremism, electronic networks), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts (violent or frozen conflicts which persist on EU borders, threatened 
minorities), State failure (corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions, lack of 
accountability, civil conflict), organised crime (cross border trafficking in drugs, women, 
illegal migrants and weapons, maritime piracy) (see comment on Recital 9 of Common 
Position 2008/944/CFSP).  
 
National security must also be assessed by taking account of international (or collective) 
security, which is among the aims pursued by the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State: 
- Territories covered by Article 5 of the NATO Treaty; 
- The outermost regions: the four French overseas department (Guadeloupe, French  
  Guiana, Martinique, Réunion); the Portuguese autonomous regions of the Azores and  
  Madeira in the Atlantic Ocean; the Spanish autonomous community in the Canary  
  Islands in the Atlantic Ocean); 
- The overseas countries and territories covered by Article 198 to 204 of the Treaty of Lisbon 
(former Article 182 to 188 of the TEC), and listed in Annex II of the Treaty of Lisbon (former 
Annex II of TEC); 
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- European territories to which the provisions of the TFEU apply under certain conditions 
(Article 355 TFEU). 
 
Allied countries refers to countries associated by treaty or an international agreement 
providing for: 
   - solidarity clause: mobilisation in case of terrorist attack or of a natural or man-made  
     disaster (Article 222 TFEU); or 
   - or mutual defence clause: aid and assistance in the event of an armed attack on one of  
     the Member States (Article 42(7) TEU). Other examples of mutual defence clause are 
     Article 5 of the NATO Treaty (except for Sweden, Ireland, Cyprus, Malta, Austria  
     and Finland). 
 
Friendly countries covers countries with which a Member State maintains a close or long 
standing bilateral relationship, particularly in the field of defence and security, or with which 
it shares values and interests and pursues common objectives. The User’s Guide establishes a 
number of criteria to determine whether a country may be considered as a friend, such as the 
number of persons holding the dual nationality, the presence of European nationals, the 
existence of language community, the number of trade agreements and cooperation 
agreements, etc.  
 
Potential effect of the export of the military technology and equipment can be:  
  - Positive: if the proposed export helps to reinforce the national security (i.e. defence 
   and security interests) of friends, allies and other Member States. In this case the a  
   priori assessment should be favourable, however without detriment to the evaluation of  
   Criteria 2 and 4.  
   - Negative: if the proposed export would directly or indirectly threaten the defence 
   and security interests of friends, allies and other Member States. In this case the a  
   priori assessment should be unfavourable. (See point 3.5.8.1).  
 
Defence and security interests should be analysed by a national authorities of the Member 
State in terms of the possible impact on the security of its forces when deployed out of area.   
 
Operational risk under criterion 5b should be analysed with respect to following 
considerations: 
 
(a) Is there a direct threat to the security of the forces of a Member State or those of a 
friendly or allied countries? 
 
(b) Is there a risk that military technology or equipment will be diverted of a force or body 
which is hostile to the interests or forces of a Member State, friend or ally? 
   - Should be taken into account the existence of terrorist groups, organisations engaged  
     in armed struggle against those currently in poser, or organised crime networks  
     which might use the equipment in activities which could be inconsistent with the  
     criteria of this Common Position. (See also comment on Criteria 7).  
 
(c) Does the recipient country have the technical capacity to use the equipment?  
   - Technical capacity refers to the ability of the recipient country to make effective use  
     of the equipment to be exported, both in material and human terms as well as to the  
     technological level of the recipient country and its operational capacity.  Following  
     questions could be considered: 
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∗Does the recipient country have the military infrastructure to be able to make    
effective use of the equipment? 
∗Is the technological level of the equipment requested proportionate to the needs 
expressed by the recipient country and to its operational capacity? 
 ∗Is similar equipment already in service well maintained? 
 ∗Are enough skilled personnel available to be able to use and maintain the  
equipment.  
 
(d) Member States could also carry out impact studies on a case-by-vase basis which could 
include following questions: 
   - The nature of equipment: whether it is directly offensive in character, the  
      technological superiority which it would confer on the forces possessing it, its  
      autonomy of use, the increase in operational performance which the equipment 
      would allow; 
   - Any distinction is the doctrine for the use of the equipment, depending on the user; 
   - The nature of the operations: war between conventional forces, asymmetric war, civil 
     war, etc. (See point 3.5.9). 
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6. Criterion Six: behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, 
as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for 
international law.  
Member States will take into account, inter alia, the record of the buyer country with regard 
to: 
a) its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime; 
b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of 
force, and with international humanitarian law; 
c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, 
in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control 
and disarmament conventions referred to point (b) of Criterion One. 
 
Comment: This criterion focus essentially on current and past record of the recipient country 
with regard to its attitude to terrorism and international organised crime, the nature of its 
alliances, its respect for international commitment and law, concerning in particular the non-
use of force, International Humanitarian Law and WMD non-proliferation, arms control 
disarmament. 
 
The User’s Guide includes a list of information sources which might guide national licensing 
authorities in the assessment of Criterion 6. In addition to EU Heads of Mission reports and 
UN Security Council Resolutions, Member States could obtain information from their 
diplomatic missions, UN and other international and regional bodies and agencies, etc. (See 
point 3.6.2. and Annex I to Chapter 3 Section 6).  
 
This criterion has to be considered for buyer countries whose Government exhibit negative 
behaviour with respect to the points a)-c) of the Criterion 6. Therefore the specific identity 
and the nature of the end-user or the equipment to be exported are not the main focus. The 
main focus is the behaviour of the buyer country more than any consideration of the risk 
that a particular transfer might have particular negative consequences. 
 
The User’s Guide lays down a number of key concepts to consider when examining requests 
in terms of Criterion 6 such as: 
 
Buyer’s country’s support of terrorism and international organised crime.  
   - Terrorism, which should be understood as terrorist acts, prohibited under international 
law, such as deliberate attacks of civilians, indiscriminate attacks, hostage taking, torture or 
deliberate and arbitrary killings, when the purpose of such attacks is to intimidate a 
population or to compel a government or an international organisation t commit or to abstain 
from committing any act.  
   - International organised crime concerns activities such as drug trafficking, trade in 
human beings, illegal immigrant smuggling, trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances, 
money laundering, conducted by a structures group of person, existing for a period of time 
and acting in concert with the aim of committing serious crimes r offences established in 
accordance with the UN convention against Trans-national Organised Crime 
 
Following questions might be asked:  
   - Does a buyer country have a record of past or present terrorist/criminal activities? 
   - Are there any known or suspected links between the buyer country and  
     terrorist/criminal organizations or any reasons to suspect that entities within, and  
     tolerated by the buyer country have those links? 
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   - Is there any other reason to suspect that the buyer country tolerates re-export or  
     diversion of military technology or equipment to terrorist/criminal organizations, or  
     that it organizes re-export or diversion itself? 
   - Does the buyer country have internal legislation that tolerates terrorist/criminal  
     activities, or does failure to apply legislation result in tolerance of terrorist/criminal 
     activities? (See point 3.6.4). 
 
Nature of buyer country’s alliances.  
The term alliance should be interpreted in a wider sense and include all those economic, 
military and defence agreements which are aimed at establishing a significant connection 
(intended also as common political aims) between two or more States. It also includes any 
shared vision of international relations; which will result in a significant action intended to 
pursue a mutual goal.  
 
Member States might ask among other questions: 
   - Does the buyer country belong to an alliance founded or acting against a Member 
     State or against an allied or friendly country? 
   - Does the buyer country belong to an alliance that does not respect or promote the  
     respect of the founding principles of the UNO.  
   - Does the buyer country belong to an alliance that acts for the destabilisation of the  
     international community? (See point 3.6.5).  
 
Buyer’s country compliance with its international commitments.  
Attention should be paid to those commitments that are legally binding for every State as both 
norms of international law and norms of treaty universally accepted by every State, including 
commitments which by their nature could be violated (i.e. non-use of force, or respect of 
international law during a conflict) in most cases by using military technology or equipment.  
Member States should also consider:  
   - Does the buyer country respect its commitments to enforce UN, OSCE, and EU arms 
     embargoes?  
   - Does the buyer country use, has it used, or is it threatening to use force in violation of  
     Article 41 of the UN Charter, in order to solve an international crisis? 
   - Does the buyer country normally infringe international common law commitments,  
     or treaties which it has voluntary signed? 
   - Does the buyer country behave in a manner so as to exclude itself from the  
     international community of states? (See point 3.6.6). 
 
Buyer’s country commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and 
disarmament.  
In particular, Member States should examine both the buyer’s country internal legislation and 
its international commitments. In addition to conventions included in Criterion 1, Member 
States might also ask the following: 
   - Does the recipient country report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, if not,  
     why not? (See also comment on UN Register of Conventional Arms). 
   - Has the recipient country aligned itself with the principles of Common Position  
     2008/944/CFSP or similar regional conventions? 
   - Is the recipient country involver in the Conference on Disarmament?  
   - Does the recipient country apply effective export and transfer controls encompassing  
     dedicated control legislation and licensing arrangements that conform to  
     international norms? 
Article 2 Criterion Six  





- Nature of buyer alliance, which should be understood in a large sense as to include all 
those economic, military and defence agreements, which, by their nature are aimed at 




Article 2 Criterion Seven  
Page31 of 95 
 
Criterion Seven: Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be 
diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions. 
In assessing the impact of the military technology or equipment to be exported on the 
recipient country and the risk that such technology or equipment might be diverted to an 
undesirable end-user, the following shall be considered: 
a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, 
including any participation in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity; 
b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use such technology 
equipment; 
c) the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls; 
d) the risk of such technology or equipment being re-exported to undesirable 
destinations, and the record of the recipient country in respecting any re-export 
provision or consent prior to re-export which the exporting Member State 
considers appropriate to impose; 
e) the risk of such technology or equipment being diverted to terrorist organisations  
or to individual terrorists; 
f) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer. 
 
Comment: As regards Criterion 7, a particular attention should be paid to the information 
exchange which might be organised through the cooperation in COARM, or by any other 
channels. In addition, the User’s Guide contains a set of information on diversionary risks 
(See point 3.7.2. and Annex I to Chapter 3 Section 7). 
 
The User’s Guide analyses a few keys concepts, which should be taken into account in any 
assessment. It should be kept in mind that diversion can be initiated at various levels, it can 
take place within a country or can involve detour or retransfer to a third “unauthorised” 
country. It can be of possession (end-user) and/or function (end-use).   
 
(a) The legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, 
including any participation in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity 
All nations have the right to defend themselves according to the UN Charter (Article 51). 
Nonetheless, an assessment should be made of whether the import is an appropriate and 
proportionate response to the recipient country’s need to defend itself, to ensure internal 
security, or to assist in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity. The following 
questions might be asked:  
   - Is there a plausible threat to security that the planned arms import could meet?  
   - Are the armed forces equipped to meet such a threat?  
   - What will the destination be of the imported goods after the participation in UN or other  
     peace-keeping activity has been terminated?  
 
The information on the exports to UN-mandated or other national missions in 2009 is 
available in the Twelfth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common 
Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military 
technology and equipment18. (See comment relative to Article 8(2)). 
 
The table contains general information on destination country, EU exporter, UN mission and 
the description of goods without the number specification.  
  
                                                
18  OJ C 9, 13.1.2011, p. 1. 
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(b) The technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment  
It can be a key indicator of the “existence of a risk” of diversion. A proposed export that 
appears technically beyond what one might normally expect to be deployed by the recipient 
state may be an indication that a third-country end-user is in fact the intended final 
destination. This concept applies equally to complete goods and systems, as well as 
components and spares. The export of components and spares where there is no evidence that 
the recipient country operates the completed system in question may be a clear indicator of 
other intent.  
Some questions that might be asked are:  
   - Is the proposed export high-tech in nature?  
   - If so, does the recipient have access to, or is it investing in, the appropriate technical  
     backup to support the sale?  
   - Does the proposed export fit with the defence profile of the recipient state?  
   - If components or spares are being requested, is the recipient state known to operate the  
     relevant system that incorporates these items?  
  
(c) The capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls  
Recipient states’ adherence to international export control norms can be a positive indictor 
against either deliberate or unintentional diversion. Some questions that might be asked are:  
   - Is the recipient state a signatory or member of key international export control treaties,  
     arrangements or regimes (e.g. Wassenaar)?  
   - Does the recipient country report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms; if not, why?  
   - Has the recipient country aligned itself with the principles of the Council Common  
     Position 2008/944/CFSP or similar regional arrangements?  
   - Does the recipient country apply effective export and transfer controls encompassing  
      dedicated control legislation and licensing arrangements that conform to international   
      norms?   
   - Is stockpile management and security of sufficient standard?  
   - Are there effective legal instruments and administrative measures in place to prevent and  
     combat corruption?  
   - Is the recipient state in the proximity of conflict zones or are there on-going tensions or  
     other factors within the recipient state that might mitigate against the reliable enforcement  
     of their export control provisions?  
   - Does the country of stated end-use have any history of diversion of arms, including the re- 
     export of surplus equipment to countries of concern?  
 
(d) The risk of such technology or equipment being re-exported to undesirable destinations, 
and the record of the recipient country in respecting any re-export provision or consent 
prior to re-export which the exporting Member State considers appropriate to impose (as 
redrafted by the present Common position) 
The competent authority should assess the reliability of the specific consignee: 
   - Is the equipment intended for the government or an individual company? 
 
If the importer is the government: 
  - Is the government/the specific government branch reliable in this respect? 
   - Has the government/the specific government branch honoured previous end-user  
     certificates? 
   - Is there any reason to suspect that the government/the specific government branch is not  
     reliable? 
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If the importer is a company: 
   - Is the company known? 
   - Is the company authorised by the government in the recipient state? 
   - Has the company previously been involved in undesirable transactions? 
   - Does the recipient country have the technical capacity to use the equipment? 
 
Technical capacity refers to the ability of the recipient country to make effective use of the 
equipment in question, both in material and human terms. It also refers to the technological 
level of the recipient country and its operational capacity, and generally to the standard of 
performance of its equipment. Consequently, examination of the compatibility of an export of 
military technology or equipment with respect to this technical capacity should include 
consideration of whether it is opportune to deliver to the recipient equipment which is more 
sensitive or sophisticated that the technological means and operational needs of the recipient 
country. 
 
(e) The risk of such technology or equipment being re-exported or diverted to terrorist 
organisations or to individual terrorists (as redrafted by the present Common Position) 
 
In assessing the potential risk in the recipient state, the competent authority might ask the 
following questions:   
   - Does the recipient state have a record of past or present terrorist activities?   
   - Are there any known or suspected links to terrorist organisations (or even individual  
     terrorists) or any reason to suspect that entities within the recipient state participate in  
     the financing of terrorism?  
   - Is there any other reason to suspect that the arms might be re-exported or diverted to  
     terrorist organisations?  
 
In addition to the considerations pursuant to point (a) – (d) the competent authority should 
also assess the reliability of the specific consignee:  
   - Is the equipment intended for the government or an individual company?   
 
If the importer is the government:  
- Is the government/the specific government branch reliable in this respect?   
- Has the government/the specific government branch honoured previous end-user    
  certificates?   
- Is there any reason to suspect that the government/the specific government branch is not  
  reliable?   
 
If the importer is a company:  
- Is the company known?   
- Is the company authorised by the government in the recipient state?   
- Has the company previously been involved in undesirable transactions?  
 
(f) The risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer (as redrafted by the 
present Common Position, previously this key concept was part of Criterion 5) 
When the Member States are deciding on an export licence application, account must be taken 
of the capabilities of the recipient, whether State or private, to analyse and to divert the 
technology contained in the military equipment being acquired. The Member States will be 
able to exchange the relevant information with a view to establishing the capabilities of a 
potential purchaser of European military equipment. 
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In this context, and particularly for equipment which uses sensitive technology, the following 
factors must be considered: 
   - The sensitivity and the level of protection of the technologies contained in the system, as  
     regards the estimated level of expert knowledge of the recipient, and the evident desire of  
     that recipient to acquire some of those technologies; 
   - The ease with which those technologies could be analysed and diverted, either to develop  
     similar equipment, or to improve other systems using the technology acquired; 
   - The quantities to be exported: the purchase of a number of sub-systems or items of  
     equipment which appears to be under (or over) estimated is an indicator of a move to  
     acquire technologies; 
   - The past behaviour of the recipient, when that recipient has previously acquired systems  
     which it has been able to examine to obtain information about the technologies used in  
     those systems. In this context, the Member States may inform one another about the cases  
     of technology theft which they have experienced. 
 
In order to determine this compatibility, Member States could consider the following 
questions: 
   - Does the recipient country have the military infrastructure to be able to make effective use  
     of the equipment? 
   - Is the technological level of the equipment requested proportionate to the needs expressed  
     by the recipient country and to its operational capacity? 
   - Is similar equipment already in service well maintained? 
   - Are enough skilled personnel available to be able to use and maintain the equipment? Are 
     there a high proportion of the country’s engineers and technicians already working  
     in the military sector? Is there a shortage of engineers and technicians in the civilian  
     sector that could  be aggravated through additional recruitment by the military  
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Criterion Eight: Compatibility of the exports of military technology or equipment with the 
technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability 
that states should meet their legitimate security and defence needs with the least diversion 
of human and economic resources for armaments.  
Member States will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such 
as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed 
export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. They 
shall consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social 
expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid. 
 
Comment: Criterion 8 is expected only to apply when the stated end-user is a government or 
a public sector entity, because it is only in respect of these end-users that the possibility of 
diverting scarce resources from social and other spending could occur.  
 
The User’s Guide outlines a two-stage “filter” system to help Member States identify export 
licence applications which may require assessment against Criterion 8 (See Annex A to 
Chapter 3 Section 8). If this system indicates that further analysis is required there is a list of 
social and economic indicators for Member States to take into account (See Annex B to 
Chapter 3 Section 8).  
 
Moreover following terms are defined by the Guide: 
Economic capacity refers to the impact of the arms import on the availability of the financial 
and economic resources of the recipient state for others purposes, in the immediate, medium 
and long term. In this regard Member States might take into account following questions: 
   - Both the capital cost of the arms purchase and the likely follow-on ‘life-cycle’ costs of  
     related operation (e.g. ancillary systems and equipment), training and maintenance;  
   - Whether the arms in question are additional to existing capabilities or are replacing them,  
     and, where appropriate, the likely savings in operating costs of older systems;   
   - How the import will be financed by the recipient country and how this might impact on its  
     external debt and balance of payments situation (See point 3.8.4a).  
 
Technical capacity refers to the ability of the recipient country to make effective use of the 
equipment in question, both in material and human terms. In this regard, Member States 
should consider the following questions:  
   - Does the recipient country have the military infrastructure to be able to make an effective  
     use of the equipment?  
   - Is similar equipment already in service well maintained?  
   - Is enough skilled personnel available to be able to use and maintain the equipment? (See  
     point 3.8.4b). 
 
Legitimate needs of security and defence require from Member States to conduct an 
assessment of whether the import is an appropriate and proportionate response to the recipient 
country’s need to defend itself, to ensure internal security, and assist in international peace-
keeping and humanitarian operations. The following questions should be considered by 
Member States:  
   - Is there a plausible threat to security that the planned arms import could meet?  
   - Are the armed forces equipped to meet such a threat?  
   - Is the planned arms import a plausible priority considering the overall threat? (See point  
     3.8.5). 
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Least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources is a matter of judgement, 
taking all relevant factors into consideration.  
Member States should consider inter alia the following questions:  
   - Is the expenditure in line with the recipient country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy or  
     programmes supported by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)?  
   - What are the levels of military expenditure in the recipient country? Has it been increasing  
     in the last five years?  
   - How transparent are state military expenditures and procurement? What are the  
     possibilities or democratic or public involvement in the state budget process?  
   - Is there a clear and consistent approach to military budgeting? Is there a well-defined 
     defence policy and a clear articulation of a country’s legitimate security needs?  
   - Are more cost-effective military systems available? (See point 3.8.6). 
  
Relative levels of military and social expenditure. Member States should consider the 
following questions in assessing whether the purchase would significantly distort the level of 
military expenditure relative to social expenditure:  
   - What is the recipient country’s level of military expenditure relative to its expenditure on  
      health and education?   
   - What is the recipient country’s military expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic  
      Product (GDP)?  
   - Is there an upward trend in the ratio of military expenditure to health and education and to  
      GDP over the last five years?  
   - If the country has high levels of military expenditure, does some of this “hide” social  
     expenditure? (e.g. in highly militarised societies, the military may provide hospitals, 
     welfare, etc). 
   - Does the country have significant levels of “off-budget” military expenditure (i.e. is there  
     significant military expenditure outside the normal processes of budgetary accountability  
     and control)? (See point 3.8.7). 
  
Member States should take into account the level of Aid Flows to the importing country and  
their potential fungibility (fungibility refers to the potential diversion of aid flows into 
inappropriate military expenditure).   
   - Is the country highly dependent on multilateral as well as EU and bilateral aid?  
   - What is the country’s aid dependency as a proportion of Gross National Income? (See  
     point 3.8.7). 
 
An assessment of the cumulative impact of arms imports on a recipient country’s economy 
can only be made with reference to exports from all sources, but accurate figures are not 
usually available. Each Member State may wish to consider the cumulative impact of its own 
arms exports to a recipient country, including recent and projected licence requests. It may 
also wish to take into account available information on current and planned exports from 
other EU Member States, as well as from other supplier States. Potential sources of 
information are, inter alia, the EU Annual Report, Member States’ annual national reports, 
the Wassenaar Arrangement, the UN Arms Register and the annual reports of the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute.  
Data on cumulative arms exports may be used to inform a more accurate assessment of:  
   - Historical, current and projected trends in a recipient country's military expenditure, and 
     how this would be affected by the proposed export;  
   - Trends in military spending as a percentage of the recipient country's income, and as a  
Article 2 Criterion Eight  
Page37 of 95 
 
     percentage of its social expenditure. (See point 3.8.9). 
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Article 3 
This Common Position shall not affect the right of Member States to operate more restrictive 
national policies. 
 
Article 4  
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Article 4 
1. Member States shall circulate details of applications for export licences which have been 
denied in accordance with the criteria of this Common Position together with an explanation 
of why the licence has been denied. Before any Member State grants a licence which has been 
denied by another Member State or States for an essentially identical transaction within the 
last three years, it shall first consult the Member State or States which issued the denial(s). If 
following consultations, the Member State nevertheless decides to grant a licence, it shall 
notify the Member State or States issuing the denial(s), giving a detailed explanation of its 
reasoning. 
 
Comment: The implementation of the no-undercut principle lays on the information received 
by Member States Authorities. If a denial has been notified by one Member State to the others 
and if another Member State receives an export application for an essentially identical 
transaction, he has, prior his decision, to consult the Member State who has issued the denial. 
If it has doubts whether or not the considered export application is an “essentially identical 
transaction”19, it should initiate a consultation in order to clarify the situation. The User’s 
Guide contains extensive guidelines on consultation procedure (See points 1.4.10-1.4.18).   
 
The consultation deadline is 3 weeks from the date of transmission of the consultation 
request, unless otherwise agreed between the parties concerned. If the consulted Member 
State has not responded within this time, it is presumed to have no objection to the licence 
application. 
 
The consulting Member State should inform all Member States, of its decision on the licence 
application, including a brief statement of its reasoning. The consulting Member State should 
send this notification within 3 weeks of reaching a decision. 
 
The information on a total number of consultations initiated and total number of consultations 
received by each Member State in 2009 as well as the table showing a total number of 
consultations for each destination concerned in 2009 are available in the Twelfth Annual 
Report (See comment relative to Article 8(2)). Hence 105 consultations were initiated by 
Member States in 2009. States that induced the highest amount of the consultations are, inter 
alia, India 13, Pakistan 7 and Yemen 7. 
 
It should be emphasised that strictly speaking, the result of the consultation is not legally 
binding.  
 
In case of a licence being refused on the basis of national policy that is stricter than that 
required under the Common Position, a DN could be issued “for information only”. Such DN 
would be added to the central database, but it will remain de-activated. In other words, it will 
not require the potential application of the no-undercut principle.  
 
2. The decision to transfer or deny the transfer of any military technology or equipment shall 
remain at the national discretion of each Member State. A denial of a licence is understood to 
take place when the Member State has refused to authorise the actual sale or export of the 
                                                
19  In order to determine whether a transaction is “essentially identical” should be assessed the technical 
specifications, the quantities and volumes and the customers and end-users of the goods concerned (See point 
1.1.5 of the User’s Guide). 
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military technology or equipment concerned, where a sale would otherwise have come about, 
or the conclusion of the relevant contract. For these purposes, a notifiable denial may, in 
accordance with national procedures, include denial of permission to start negotiations or a 
negative response to a formal initial enquiry about a specific order. 
 
 
Comment: According to User’s Guide practices currently differ between Member States as to 
when their companies approach to their government authorities to get export permissions (i.e. 
need of formal export licence application; early non-binding indications).  
 
Each request should meet has to respect formal requirements before a formal response can be 
given and, if negative, notifies as a denial by the government authority. Thus a request 
without certain factual information or a brief request over the telephone or an e-mail will not 
be considered as an application. A denial should be notifies when the government authority 
has refused an application for export approval made in writing (email, fax or letter) with a 
certain degree of precision giving enough information on which to base a decision.  
 
A minimum level of information that should be contained in a written request is: 
   - country of destination; 
   - full description of the goods concerned, including quality and where appropriate  
     technical specifications; 
   - buyer (specifying whether the buyer is a government agency, branch of the armed 
     forces, paramilitary force or a private natural or legal person);  
   - proposed end-user (See point 1.1.4 of the User’s Guide). 
 
A denial notification (DN) should be issued when: 
   - a Member State revokes an extant export licence; 
   - a Member State denies an export licence that is relevant to the scope of the Common  
     Position, and has already circulated a DN relating to this denial in other international 
     export control regimes; 
   - a Member State refused an export transaction deemed essentially identical to a 
     transaction previously refused by another Member State and notified as a denial. In  
     order to determine whether a transaction is “essentially identical” should be assessed 
     the technical specifications, the quantities and volumes and the customers and end- 
     users of the goods concerned (See point 1.1.5 of the User’s Guide). 
 
A denial notification should not be issued if: 
   - an application for approval has either not been made in writing or has not provided  
     all required information (See point 1.1.4 of the User’s Guide).  
 
The User’s Guide lays down an extensive description of information elements to be included 
in a denial notification on export licence and on arms broker registration. 
Thus a denial notification document should contain: 
- Identification number; 
- Country of final destination; 
- Date of notification; 
- Contact details for more information; 
- Short description of the goods; 
- Control List reference; 
- Stated end-use; 
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- Consignee and end-user; 
- Reason for notification of denial/amendment/revocation; 
- Additional remarks; 
- Origin country of the goods 
- Broker’s name and details; 
- Information element(s) to be amended; 
- New information element(s); 
- Effective date of amendment or revocation. (See point 1.2.2 and Annex Form 1-3 of the 
User’s Guide).  
 
Up until 2009 the information exchange on DNs was provided by the Council Secretariat 
which on a monthly basis used to send to Member States, via appointed persons in their 
Permanent Representations in Brussels, a disc containing the latest version of the database.  
The procedure established in 2009 stipulates that the Council Secretariat will hand a disc 
containing the latest version of the database to a representative of each Member State at 
meetings of the Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM). This procedure 
will remain in force until remote access to a secure database is possible (See point 1.4.9 of the 
User’s Guide).  
 
Contrary to the former Code of Conduct on arms exports, the scope of the Common Position 
covers brokering activities, transit, transhipment and intangible transfers of technology. 
Hence all procedures for circulation, handling and storage of DNs equally apply to those 
transactions. However, brokering DNs should be clearly identified on the database by the 
Council Secretariat (See point 1.4.19-1.4.20 of the User’s Guide).  
 
3. Member States shall keep such denials and consultations confidential and not use them for 
commercial advantage.  
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Article 5 
Export licences shall be granted only on the basis of reliable prior knowledge of end use in 
the country of final destination. This will generally require a thoroughly checked end-user 
certificate or appropriate documentation and/or some form of official authorisation issued by 
the country of final destination. When assessing applications for licences to export military 
technology or equipment for the purposes of production in third countries, Member States 
shall in particular take account of the potential use of the finished product in the country of 
production and of the risk that the finished product might be diverted or exported to an 
undesirable end user. 
 
Comment: The User’s Guide defines a common core of elements that should appear in an 
end-user certificate when it is required by a Member State: 
Minimum elements of that should be included in the end-user certificate:  
    - Exporter’s details (at least name, address and business name); 
    - End-user’s details (at least name, address and business name). In the case of an  
      export to a firm which resells the goods on the local market, the firm will be  
      regarded as the end-user;   
    - Country of final destination; 
    - Description of the goods being exported (type, characteristics), or reference to the  
      contract concluded with the authorities of the country of final destination; 
    - Quantity and/or value of the exported goods; 
    - Signature, name and position of the end-user; 
    - Date of the end-user certificate; 
    - End-use and/or re-export clause if appropriate; 
    - Indication of the end-use of the goods; 
    - An undertaking, where appropriate, that the goods being exported will not be used for 
      purposes other than declared use; 
    - An undertaking, where appropriate, that the goods will not be used in the development, 
      production or use of a weapon of mass destruction or for missiles capable of delivering 
      such weapons. 
 
Others elements that might be required by Member State Authorities, at their discretion, are 
inter alia:  
 - A clause prohibiting re-export of the goods covered in the end-user certificate. Such 
clause could, among other requirements, contain: 
 ∗ a pure and simple ban on re-export;  
 ∗ a provision that re-export will be subject to agreement in writing of the authorities of  
 the original exporting country;  
 ∗ a permission for re-export without the prior authorisation of the authorities of the 
exporting country to certain countries identified in the end-user certificate. 
  
 - Full details, where appropriate, on the intermediary;  
 - If the end-user certificate comes from the government of the country of destination of the 
goods, the certificate will be attested by the authorities of the exporting country in order to 
check the authenticity of the signature and the capacity of the signatory to make commitments 
on behalf of its government;  
 - A commitment by the final consignee to provide the exporting State with a Delivery 
Verification certificate upon request. 
 
Assessment of application for incorporation and re-export 
Article 5  
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The Common Position should be fully applied to licence applications where it is understood 
that the goods are to be incorporated into products for export. An assessment of such 
applications should include following considerations:  
   - the export control policies and effectiveness of the export control system of the  
     incorporating country; 
   - the importance of their defence and security relationship with that country; 
   - the materiality and significance of the goods in relation to the goods into which they 
     are to be incorporated and in relation to any end-use of the finished products which  
     might give rise to concern; 
    - the ease with which the goods, or significant parts of them could be removed from  
     the goods into which they are to be incorporated; 
   - the standing entity to which the goods are to be exported (See point 2.2.1 of the  
     User’s Guide).   
 
Post-shipment verification 
Whereas the export controls mainly focus of the pre-licensing phase, post-shipment control 
also represents an important tool to strengthen the effectiveness of national arms export 
control.  
 
Post-shipment measures, such as on-site verification or delivery verification certificates, are 
especially efficient to prevent diversion of re-export under undesirable conditions. Member 
States are invited to share information on their national provisions adopted to implement post-
shipment controls (See point 2.4.1 of the User’s Guide).  
 
The export of controlled equipment for humanitarian purposes 
In post-conflict areas, certain items can make important contributions to the safety of the 
civilian population and to economic reconstruction. Such exports are not necessarily 
inconsistent with the criteria set out in Article 2 of the Common Position and will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. Member States will require adequate safeguards against 
misuse of such exports and, where appropriate, provisions for repatriation of the equipment 
(See point 2.4.1 of the User’s Guide).  
 
Article 6 
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Article 6 
Without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000, the criteria in Article 2 of this 
Common Position and the consultation procedure provided for in Article 4 are also to 
apply to Member States in respect of dual-use goods and technology as specified in 
Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 where there are serious grounds for believing that 
the end-user of such goods and technology will be the armed forces or internal security 
forces or similar entities in the recipient country. References in this Common Position to 
military technology or equipment shall be understood to include such goods and technology. 
 
Comment: This Article has to be read presently in connection with Article 12(1)(c) of the 
Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 (repealing and replacing the Regulation 1344/2000). 
Nevertheless, it is not clear how both provisions (the one of the Regulation and the one of the 
Common Position) might interfere. Shall Member States take into consideration when 
assessing an export application for dual-use the eight criteria of the Common Position if the 
end-user will be the armed force of the recipient States? If politically such mechanism might 
be required, the Common Position cannot legally extend the Member States’ obligation to 
consider such criteria in the consultation mechanism for an essentially identical transaction 
previously denied established by Article 13 neither extend the criteria list of Article 12 of the 
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Article 7 
In order to maximise the effectiveness of this Common Position, Member States shall 
work within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their 
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Article 8 
1. Each Member State shall circulate to other Member States in confidence an annual 
report on its exports of military technology and equipment and on its implementation of 
this Common Position. 
2. An EU Annual Report, based on contributions from all Member States, shall be 
submitted to the Council and published in the ‘C’ series of the Official Journal of the 
European Union. 
3. In addition, each Member State which exports technology or equipment on the EU 
Common Military List shall publish a national report on its exports of military technology 
and equipment, the contents of which will be in accordance with national legislation, as 
applicable, and will provide information for the EU Annual Report on the implementation 
of this Common Position as stipulated in the User’s Guide. 
 
Comment: Annual Reports, which review the Code implementation by Member States, are 
being adopted by the Council since 1999. They are available at the following website:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1484&lang=en  
 
Twelfth Annual Report defining common rules governing control of exports of military 
technology and equipment was published in Official Journal C 9, 13.1.2011, p. 1. This Report 
broaches the implementation of the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP by the 
Member States and contains several tables on the practical application thereof.  
 
Since a few years the Annual Report keeps a similar structure composed of three parts.  
 
The first part concerns the implementation of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. 
This part includes a number of paragraphs on practical implementation of the Common 
Position, such as national provisions of Member States that transpose the Common Position, a 
summary of recent amendments of the User’s Guide and of the Common Military List.  
 
A particular interest is dedicated to the outreach activities. The European Union asserts the 
promotion of principles and criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP among third 
countries. Thus a number of outreach seminars were organised on the basis of Joint Action 
2008/230/CFSP involving Eastern European and Caucasian countries and Balkans. Other 
events were organised in the context of Council Decision 2009/1012/CFSP20 and Council 
Decision 2009/42/CFSP21. 
 
In the framework of political dialogue meetings, troika meetings with Canada, Norway, the 
Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States were held under the several presidencies. 
 
The Report also puts forward the latest achievements in the developments related to the Arms 
Trade Treaty, arms brokering and intra-community transfers.  
 
                                                
20  Council Decision 2009/1012/CFSP of 22 December 2009 on support for EU activities in order to 
promote the control of arms exports and the principles and criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP among 
third countries (OJ L 348, 29.12.2009, p. 16).  
21  Council Decision 2009/42/CFSP of 19 January 2009 on support for EU activities in order to promote 
among third countries the process leading towards an Arms Trade Treaty, in the framework of the European 
Security Strategy (OJ L 17, 22.1.2009, p. 39).  
Article 8 
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The second part examines a state of play concerning the implementation of other priority 
measures identified in the previous annual report (i.e. eleventh annual report).   
 
Finally the third part lays down the priority guidelines for COARM for the near future. The 
following areas were identified as requiring a consolidation: 
   1. ensuring EU coordination and input in the negotiating process on the Arms Trade Treaty, 
providing expert contribution for the preparation of the spring 2011 session of the Preparatory 
Committee; 
   2. ensuring the implementation of Council Decision 2010/336/CFSP on EU activities in 
support of the Arms Trade Treaty including through the participation of COARM experts in 
outreach regional seminars; 
   3. ensuring that all Member States have adopted the appropriate national laws or 
administrative rules to fully implement: 
     - Common Position 2003/468/CFSP on the control of arms brokering; 
     - Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of  
       exports of military technology and equipment; 
   4. ensuring efficient, effective and worthwhile outreach events as provided for in Council 
Decision 2009/1012/CFSP; 
   5. continued exchanges of information on arms export policies towards particular 
destinations; 
   6. updates of/additions to the User’s Guide and EU Common Military List; 
   7. continued dialogue with the European Parliament and NGOs; 
   8. early finalisation and publishing of the 13th EU annual report on arms exports; 
   9. contribution to discussions on the transposition into national legislation of Directive 
2009/43/EC on intra-Community transfers of defence-related products, in order to ensure that 
security concerns are not jeopardised, and that implementation is as harmonised as possible 
throughout the EU. 
 
Annexes of the Report contain information on conventional arms exports and implementation 
of Common Posiiton 2008/944/CFSP by the Member States over the period 1 January to 31 
December 2009. The following tables are available:  
  - Tables setting out exports and license refusals per destination, per region and worldwide 
(See Article 1(1));  
  - Table showing exports to United Nations-mandated or other national missions in 2008 (See 
Article 2(7)(a));  
  - Table providing information on brokering licenses granted and denied per Member State 
(See Article 3 of Common Position 2003/468/CFSP);   
  - Table showing a total number of consultations initiated and total number of consultations 
received by each Member State in 2009 (See Article 4(1)); 
  - Table showing a total number of consultations for each destination concerned in 2008 (See 
Article 4(1)); 
  - Information on national legislation implementing Common Position 2003/468/CFSP on the 
control of arms brokering and Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules for 
the control of the exports of military technology and equipment or, for those Member States 
which have not yet fully implemented these Common Positions, providing information on the 
state of play (see Article 12); 
  - Table of outreach activities carried out by the EU and Member States (1 January 2009 to 
30 June 2010) (see Article 11); 
  - Table showing Internet addresses for national reports on Arms Exports.  
Article 9 
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Article 9 
Member States shall, as appropriate, assess jointly through the CFSP framework the 
situation of potential or actual recipients of exports of military technology and equipment 
from Member States, in the light of the principles and criteria of this Common Position.
                                                                                    Article 10   
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Article 10 
While Member States, where appropriate, may also take into account the effect of 
proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, these 
factors shall not affect the application of the above criteria. 
                                                                                    Article 11   
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Article 11 
Member States shall use their best endeavours to encourage other States which export 
military technology or equipment to apply the criteria of this Common Position. They shall 
regularly exchange experiences with those third states applying the criteria on their 
military technology and equipment export control policies and on the application of the 
criteria. 
Comment: the information on the outreach activities carried out by the EU and Member 
States from 1 January 2009 to 30 June 2010 is available in the Twelfth Annual Report (See 
comment relative to Article 8(2)). 
 
The information is provided on target/host country and date, on Member State providing 
assistance/outreach and on description of assistance/outreach. In total, 16 outreach activities 
were initiated in 2009-2010.  
 
 
                                                                                    Article 12   
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Article 12 
Member States shall ensure that their national legislation enables them to control the 
export of the technology and equipment on the EU Common Military List. The EU 
Common Military List shall act as a reference point for Member States’ national military 
technology and equipment lists, but shall not directly replace them. 
 
Comment: The Common Military List of the European Union was laid down by the Council 
in June 2000. The last version thereof was adopted on 15 February 2010 (OJ C 69, 18.3.2010, 
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Table 1: Information on national legislation implementing Common 
Position 2003/468/CFSP and Common Position 2008/944/CFSP or, for those 
Member States which have not yet fully implemented these Common 




Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP 
on the control of arms brokering (OJ L 156 
of 25.6.2003, p. 79) 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
defining common rules governing control of 
exports of military technology and equipment 




concerning state of 
play 
National  legislation 
reference no. 
Information 
concerning state of 
play 
Austria 
Foreign Trade Act 
(AussHG, Federal 
Gazette I No. 
50/2005) and War 
Material Act (KMG 
Federal Gazette I no. 
540/1977 as amended 




Foreign Trade Act 
(AussHG, Federal 
Gazette I No. 50/2005) 
and War Material Act 
(KMG Federal Gazette 
I no. 540/1977 as 
amended by Federal 




Law of 25 March 
2003, article 12, 
(published in 
Moniteur belge of 
7.7.2003, modifying 
law of 5.8.1991. 
Patial 
implementation. 
Law of 26 March 2003 
(published in Moniteur 
belge of 7.7.2003, 





Law on export 
control of arms and 
dual use items 
and technologies into 
force 5.02.2007. 
 
Regulation for the 
implementation of the 
Export Control Law 











A new basic law for the control of exports and imports has already been submitted to the 
Parliament for approval. Regulations, by which Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and 
Common Position 2003/468/CFSP will be implemented, will be issued by virtue of this law. 
Afterwards, these regulations will be submitted to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of 
Cyprus for approval. 
Czech 
Republic 
Amendment to Act 
No. 38/1994 on 
foreign trade in 
military material, 
amended by Act No. 
357/2004 to make 
clear reference to 
brokering activities 




Amendment  to Act 
No. 38/1994 on foreign 
trade in military 
material amended by 
Act No. 220/2009 
reflects certain 







New National ML 
listing 22 items in 
conformity with the 
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Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP 
on the control of arms brokering (OJ L 156 
of 25.6.2003, p. 79) 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
defining common rules governing control of 
exports of military technology and equipment 









concerning state of 
play 
Denmark 
Act No. 555 of 24 









Consolidated Act No. 






(In Denmark national 
law will not have to 
be changed after the 
adoption of the 
Common Position. 
The criteria of the 
Common Position are 
taken into account as 
a minimum standard 
in the assessment of 
licence applications). 
Estonia 
Strategic Goods Act 
RT I 2004, 2,7 
amended by RT I 
2004 53, 366. 
Implementation 
completed. 
Strategic Goods Act 
RT I 2004, 2,7 
amended by RT I 2004 
53, 366. 
References to criteria 
6 and 8 of Common 
Position 2008/944 
need to be updated in 
the present 
legislation. This work 
is currently in 
process. By the 
completion of 
amending the law, 
controls based on 
criteria 6 and 8 can 
still be executed and 
denial issued under 
the reference of § 
16.2.10 of Strategic 




Decision of Council 
of State on General 
Guidelines for 
Export, Transit and 




Position on  
Brokering. 
The former EU CoC is 
already incorporated 
into the Finnish 
legislation as an annex 
to the National 
Guidelines 
(1000/2002). 
Changes will be 
made as one part of 
the ongoing work on 
revising the 
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Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP 
on the control of arms brokering (OJ L 156 
of 25.6.2003, p. 79) 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
defining common rules governing control of 
exports of military technology and equipment 













brokering of war 
weapons adopted in 
1978.  
 
Amendment to fully 
implement the 
Common Position on 
brokering 
(2003/468/GASP) is in 
force since the end of 
July 2006. This means 
that not only the 
brokering of war 
weapons, but of all 
items of the EU 




In Germany national law 
will not have to be 
changed after the 
adoption of the Common 
Position. The existing 
legal requirements in 
connection with the 
‘Political Principles 
Adopted by the 
Government of the 
Federal Republic of 
Germany for the Export 
of War Weapons and 
Other Military 
Equipment’ make it 
possible to immediately 
apply the regulations 












Gov. decree. 16/2004 
on the licensing of the 
export, import, transfer 






The Code of Conduct on 
arms export has been 
incorporated into 
Government Decree 
16/2004 on arms exports 







16/2004 on arms 
exports and is effective 
since December 1, 
2009.  
Ireland 
Control of Exports Act 
2008 (No. 1 of 2008). 
  Consultations being 
initiated with Attorney 
General on eventual 
need for implementing 
legislation. 
Italy 
 New draft law for all 
the sector is in 
preparation and will 
include also the 
Common Position. 
 New draft law for all 
the sector is in 
preparation and will 
include also the 
Common Position. 
Latvia 
Law on the Circulation 
of Strategic Goods (in 
force since 





Law on the Circulation 
of Strategic Goods (in 
force since 19 July 
2007). 




implementation to be 
passed by the 
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Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP 
on the control of arms brokering (OJ L 156 
of 25 May 2003, pages 79-80). 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
defining common rules governing control of 
exports of military technology and equipment 









concerning state of 
play 
Lithuania 
Law on the Control 
of Strategic Goods 
which came into 
effect on 1 August 
2004, amended 6 
April 2006 (effective 




Law on the Control of 
Strategic Goods which 
came into effect on 1 
August 2004, amended 
6 April 2006 (effective 
as of 1 July 2006). 
Pending amendment 
of the Law on the 
Control of Strategic 
Goods: references to 
EU Code of Conduct 
have to be replaced 
with references to 
Common Position 
Luxembourg 
 Amendment to 
implement 
















Decree on Financial 
Involvement 
concerning Strategic 
Goods Order of 1996, 
as amended in 1999 
and 2001; 
 




In the Netherlands 
national law will not 
have to be changed 
after the adoption of 
the Common Position. 
The legal basis for the 
application of the 
regulations laid down 
in the Common 
Position consists of 
several existing Acts, 





Law no. 49/2009 of 




 New Law under 
preparation. It will be 




include provisions on 
intra-community 
transfers, in 
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Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP 
on the control of arms brokering (OJ L 156 
of 25 May 2003, pages 79-80). 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
defining common rules governing control of 
exports of military technology and equipment 









concerning state of 
play 
Poland 
Law of 29/11/2000 
on foreign trade in 
goods, technologies 
and services of 
strategic importance 
to the security of the 
state and to 
maintaining 
international peace 
and security (uniform 
text - Journal of Laws 




 Amendment of Law 
of 29/11/2000 that 
covers both - trade in 
arms and in dual-use 
goods is planned to 
be completed by the 
end of 2010 so that it 
also duly reflects and 
complies with the 
provisions of Council 
Regulation (EC) 
No 428/2009 of 5 
May 2009 setting up 
a Community regime 
for the control of 
exports, transfer, 
brokering and transit 
of dual-use items and 
Directive 2009/43/EC 
of the European 
Parliament and of the 
Council of 6 May 
2009 simplifying 
terms and conditions 
of transfers of 
defence-related 
products within the 
Community. 
Romania 
Law no. 595/2004 






Law no. 179/1998 on 
trading in Military 
material, as amended. 
Implementation 
completed. 
 In preparation within 
the ongoing process 






                                                
22  Poland first adopted legislation covering brokering activities in the Act of 11 December 1997 on 
administrating of foreign trade in goods and services and transfers of special goods (Journal of Laws 1997, No. 
157, item 1026). 
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Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP 
on the control of arms brokering (OJ L 156 
of 25 May 2003, pages 79-80). 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
defining common rules governing control of 
exports of military technology and equipment 









concerning state of 
play 
Slovenia 
Decree on permits 
and consents for trade 
and production of 
military weapons and 
equipment (Official 
Gazette 18/03, 31/05, 
113/07). Brokers are 




Article 77 of the 
Defence Act (Official 
Gazette 103/04) 
specifies that an export 
license may be refused 




Amendments to the 
legislation 
concerning Defence 
exports and inclusion 
of provisions on 
Intra-Community 
Transfers, in line with 
the Directive on 
Intra-Community 










Law 53/2007 of 
28/12/2007. 
A new Royal Decree 













Budget letter for the 
licensing authority, No. 
UD2009/83256/PLAN 
the Ordinance with 
instructions for the 
licensing authority, No 
2007:1219. 
Possible measures 
will be reviewed in 
connection with an 
analysis of the 
implementation 







Trade in controlled 
goods order effective 




All export licence 
applications are 
required by statute to 
be assessed against the 
Consolidated EU and 
National Arms Export 
Licensing Criteria 
which reflects the 
Common Position. 
The UK is working to 
bring the 
Consolidated EU and 
National Arms 
Export Licensing 
Criteria fully in line 
with the Common 
Position, this should 







                                                                  Article 13, 14, 15, 16   
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Article 13 
The User’s Guide to the European Code of Conduct on Exports of Military Equipment, 
which is regularly reviewed, shall serve as guidance for the implementation of this 
Common Position. 
Article 14 
This Common Position shall take effect on the date of its adoption. 
Article 15 
This Common Position shall be reviewed three years after its adoption. 
Article 16 
This Common Position shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
 
Done at Brussels, 8 December 2008. 
 
        For the Council 














Part II: The European Union regime of 





Introductive Remark: EU regime of acquisition and possession of weapons is regulated by 
Directive 91/477/EEC as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC.  
In order to facilitate understanding we have represented a consolidated version of aforesaid 
Directives as follows: 
- Directive 91/477/EEC (in black in the present text),  
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Introductive Remark:  
 
Main objectives and principles of Directive 91/477/EEC: 
Main objective of this Directive is to abolish controls on the possession of firearms at internal 
Community borders and partially to harmonise national laws on such firearms. 
 
The abolition of controls at internal Community borders on January 1st, 1993 has de facto 
constrained the EU to adopt the rules in order to accomplish controls on arms circulation 
within the Member States. Moreover, it was essential to confine the absence of borders, 
thereby avoiding an incentive to buy arms in countries with less strict legislation. This 
Directive balances the necessity to control the movement of weapons and the principle of 
single market. It introduces the rules on acquisition and possession of firearms and organises 
transfers of firearms between Member States.  
 
Procedure established by this Directive focuses on following subjects: 
  -  A requirement of licence for transfers of firearms between Member States; 
  -  A requirement of authorisation for the cross-border movement of persons travelling in      
      possession of a firearm. Nevertheless, more flexible rules were introduced as regards     
      hunting and sport target shooting.  
 
It should be noted that Directive 91/477/EEC constitutes a standard of harmonisation; 
consequently Member States are free to adopt more restrictive provisions, on the assumption 
of their respect of the rules of the Treaty, particularly the principles of proportionality and 
subsidiarity. 
 
Following issues are excluded of the scope of application of this Directive (Article 2): 
   -  Commercial transfers of weapons of war and ammunition;  
   -  Acquisition and possession of weapons and ammunition by the armed forces, the police,  
      the public authorities, as well as collectors and cultural and historical organisations; 
   -  Carrying of weapons, hunting or sport target shooting activities; 
   -  Acquisition or possession of weapons and ammunition by collectors and bodies concerned  
      with the cultural and historical aspects of weapons and recognised as such by the  
      Member State in which they are established; 
   -  Operations which do not take place within the EU borders. 
 
 
Main objectives and principles of Directive 2008/51/EC: 
Amendments introduced by Directive 2008/51/EC were substantially due to the accession of 
the EU to the UN Protocol on the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their 
parts, components and ammunition (see comment relative to Recital 2 of this Directive).  
 
However, it should be kept in mind that this Directive concerns transfers and commerce of 
firearms undertaken exclusively within the European Community borders, whereas the 
Protocol affects much larger scope of countries.  
 
Those amendments shall fulfil several objectives: 
  -  Harmonisation of the European legislation;  
  -  Fighting the illegal market of weapons initially intended for civilian use;  
  -  Averting penetration of legal weapons in illegal market;  
  -  Definition, within the scope of application of the Directive, of the notions of 'illicit    
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     manufacturing and trafficking of firearms'; 
  -  Provisions related to the marking of weapons; 
  -  Extension of the period for register keeping prescribed by Directive 91/477/EEC;  
  -  Clarification of applicable penalties; 
  -  Inclusion of general principles on deactivation of weapons defined by the  
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Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 18 June 1991 on control of the acquisition 
and possession of weapons  
Official Journal L 256, 13/09/1991 P.0051–0058 
 
Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
May 2008 amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the 
acquisition and possession of weapons 
Official Journal L 179, 8/07/2008, P. 0005–0011 
 
Comment: In order to get more information on the grounds and purposes of Directive 
2008/51/EC following documents can be consulted:  
   - European Parliament debate on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons of 28 
November 200723. 
   - Proposal for a Directive amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC24. 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,  
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in 
particular Article 100a thereof,  
Complementary information: Due to the fact that the Directive is dated the18 June 1991, it 
should be emphasised that the term “Treaty” refers to the Single European Act (Luxembourg, 
17 February 1986, and The Hague, 28 February 1986).  
 
“Article 100a 
1. By way of derogation from Article 100 and save where otherwise provided in this Treaty, 
the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 8a. 
The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission in co-
operation with the European Parliament and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market. 
(...) 
4. If, after the adoption of a harmonization measure by the Council acting by a qualified 
majority, a Member State deems it necessary to apply national provisions on grounds of 
major needs referred to in Article 36, or relating to protection of the environment or the 
working environment, it shall notify the Commission of these provisions. 
The Commission shall confirm the provisions involved after having verified that they are not a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. 
By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 169 and 170, the Commission 
or any Member State may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers 
that another Member State is making improper use of the powers provided for in this Article. 
5. The harmonization measures referred to above shall, in appropriate cases, include a 
safeguard clause authorizing the Member States to take, for one or more of the non-economic 
                                                
23  This debate is available at the following website:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20071128&secondRef=ITEM-
021&language=EN&ring=A6-2007-0276.  
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reasons referred to in Article 36, provisional measures subject to a Community control 
procedure.” 
Including several modifications, present Article has become Article 114 TFEU. 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,  
 
In cooperation with the European Parliament,  
 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee,  
 
Whereas Article 8a of the Treaty provides that the internal market must be established by not 
later than 31 December 1992; whereas the internal market comprises an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty;  
Complementary information:  
“Article 8a 
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal 
market over a period expiring on 3l December 1992, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article and of Articles 8b, 8c, 28, 57 (2), 59, 70 (1), 84, 99, 100a and 100b and without 
prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty. 
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital it ensured in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty.” 
Including several modifications, present Article is mentioned as Article 14 EC which became 
Article 26 TFEU with the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Whereas, at its meeting in Fontainebleau on 25 and 26 June 1984, the European Council 
expressly set the objective of abolishing all police and customs formalities at intra-
Community frontiers;  
 
Whereas the total abolition of controls and formalities at intra-Community frontiers entails the 
fulfilment of certain fundamental conditions; whereas in its white paper 'Completing the 
internal market' the Commission stated that the abolition of controls on the safety of objects 
transported and on persons entails, among other things, the approximation of weapons 
legislation;  
 
Complementary information: White Paper from the Commission to the European 
Council regarding the completion of the internal market25 
Taking into account a lack of progress in the cooperation within the EU, a more effective 
approach appeared to be necessary. Therefore, in its White Paper, approved on 28-29 June 
1985 by the European Council in Milan, the Commission has shaped a program for 
implementation of the internal market.  
In order to complete the establishment of the internal market, the White Paper suggested 
several legislative measures which aim at:  
  -  the elimination of physical frontiers, by abolishing checks on goods and persons at internal  
     frontiers,  
                                                
25  White paper “Completing the internal market” is available at the following website:  
http://www.ena.lu/white_paper_completion_internal_market_14_june_1985-020003520.html.  
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  -  the elimination of technical frontiers: breaking down the barriers of national regulations on  
     products and services, by harmonisation or mutual recognition, 
  -  the elimination of tax frontiers: overcoming the obstacles created by the differences in   
     indirect taxes, by harmonisation or approximation of VAT rates and excise duty. 
The Part One of the White Paper is dedicated to the removal of physical barriers present in 
national arms-related legislations. Section III thereof “Control of Individuals” includes point 
55 which expresses a wish of the Commission to “arrive at the stage whereby checks on the 
entry are also abolished for Community citizens arriving from another Community country”.  
For this purpose the Commission had to table a proposal to balance the necessity to control 
the movement of weapons and the principle of single market. In other words, it was essential 
to confine the absence of borders, hence avoiding an incentive to buy arms in the counties 
with less strict legislation. According to the White Paper such proposal had to be drafted in 
1985 with target approval in 1988 at the latest. 
Whereas abolition of controls on the possession of weapons at intra-Community frontiers 
necessitates the adoption of effective rules enabling controls to be carried out within Member 
States on the acquisition and possession of firearms and on their transfer to another Member 
State; whereas systematic controls must therefore be abolished at intra-Community frontiers;  
 
Whereas the mutual confidence in the field of the protection of the safety of persons which 
these rules will generate between Member States will be the greater if they are underpinned 
by partially harmonized legislation; whereas it would therefore be useful to determine 
category of firearms whose acquisition and possession by private persons are to be prohibited, 
or subject to authorization, or subject to declaration;  
 
Whereas passing from one Member State to another while in possession of a weapon should, 
in principle, be prohibited; whereas a derogation therefrom is acceptable only if a procedure is 
adopted that enables Member States to be notified that a firearm is to be brought into their 
territory;  
 
Whereas, however, more flexible rules should be adopted in respect of hunting and target 
shooting in order to avoid impeding the free movement of persons more that is necessary;  
Whereas the Directive does not affect the right of Member States to take measures to prevent 
illegal trade in weapons,  
 
Whereas: 
(1) Directive 91/477/EEC established an accompanying measure for the internal market. It 
creates a balance between on the one hand the undertaking to ensure a certain freedom of 
movement for some firearms within the Community, and on the other the need to control this 
freedom using security guarantees suited to this type of product. 
 (2) In accordance with Council Decision 2001/748/EC of 16 October 2001 concerning the 
signing on behalf of the European Community of the United Nations Protocol on the illicit 
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts, components and ammunition, 
annexed to the Convention against transnational organised crime, the Commission signed that 
Protocol (hereinafter referred to as the Protocol) on behalf of the Community on 16 January 
2002. 
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Complementary Information: United Nations Protocol on the illicit manufacturing of 
and trafficking in firearms, their parts, components and ammunition, annexed to the 
Convention against transnational organized crime26: 
 
The Protocol was adopted by the UN Resolution 55/255 and it entered into force on 3 June 
2005. It reflects the necessity for all States to take appropriate measures in order to prevent, 
combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, their parts and 
components and ammunition, owing to the harmful effects of those activities on the security 
of the world as a whole. 
 
It applies to the prevention of illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts 
and components and ammunition as well as to the investigation and prosecution of established 
offences. It shall not apply to State-to-State transactions or to State transfers in cases where 
the application of the Protocol would prejudice the right of a State Party to take action in the 
interest of national security consistent with the UN Charter. 
 
According to Council Decision 2001/748/EC27, the Protocol was signed by the Commission 
on behalf of the Community on 16 January 2002. 
(3) The accession of the Community to the Protocol requires amendments to certain 
provisions of Directive 91/477/EEC. Indeed, it is important to ensure the coherent, effective 
and rapid application of the international commitments affecting that Directive. Furthermore, 
it is necessary to take the opportunity of this revision in order to improve that Directive by 
addressing certain issues, in particular those that were identified in the report of the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 15 December 2000 on the 
implementation of Directive 91/477/EEC. 
(4) Police intelligence evidence shows an increase in the use of converted weapons within the 
Community. It is therefore essential to ensure that such convertible weapons are brought 
within the definition of a firearm for the purposes of Directive 91/477/EEC. 
Comment: The relevance of control of converted weapons shall be emphasised. Taking into 
account their particularly dangerous nature, Article 1(1) of this Directive integrates converted 
weapons in notion of “firearms”. In addition, in order to avoid legal uncertainty, paragraph 2 
of Article 1(1) specifies that object capable of being converted to expel a shot, bullet or 
projectile shall satisfy following conditions:  
 - it has the appearance of a firearm, and 
 - as a result of its construction or the material from which it is made, it can be so converted. 
It should be also noted that Annex I of this Directive covers the ‘firearms disguised as other 
objects’ and classifies them in Category A-Prohibited firearms.  
(5) Firearms, their parts and ammunition, when imported from third countries, are subject to 
Community legislation and, accordingly, to the requirements of Directive 91/477/EEC. 
                                                
26  The full text of the Protocol is available at the following website:  
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/255e.pdf. 
27  OJ L 280, 24.10.2001, p. 5.  
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Comment: It must be emphasised that the Directive applies only to the imports of firearms, 
their parts and ammunition. The exports of firearms are subject to Council Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP as well as to Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP.  
(6) The notions of illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, their parts and 
ammunition, as well as the notion of tracing, should therefore be defined for the purposes of 
Directive 91/477/EEC. 
(7) Furthermore, the Protocol establishes an obligation to mark weapons at the time of 
manufacture and at the time of transfer from government stocks to permanent civilian use, 
whereas Directive 91/477/EEC refers only indirectly to the marking obligation. In order to 
facilitate the tracing of weapons, it is necessary to use alphanumeric codes and to include in 
the marking the year of manufacture of the weapon (if not part of the serial number). The 
Convention of 1 July 1969 on Reciprocal Recognition of Proofmarks on Small Arms should, 
to the greatest extent possible, be used as a reference for the marking system in the 
Community as a whole. 
(8) Moreover, while the Protocol provides that the period during which registers containing 
information on weapons are to be kept must be increased to at least 10 years, it is necessary, 
in view of the dangerous nature and durability of weapons, to extend this period up to a 
minimum of 20 years in order to allow the proper tracing of firearms. It is also necessary that 
Member States keep a computerised data-filing system, either a centralised system or a 
decentralised system which guarantees access to authorised authorities to the data-filing 
systems in which the necessary information regarding each firearm is recorded. Access by 
police, judicial and other authorised authorities to the information contained in the 
computerised data-filing system must be subject to compliance with Article 8 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
(9) In addition, the brokering activities referred to in Article 15 of the Protocol should be 
defined for the purposes of Directive 91/477/EEC. 
(10) In some serious cases, compliance with Articles 5 and 6 of the Protocol requires the 
application of criminal sanctions and the confiscation of the weapons. 
(11) With regard to the deactivation of firearms, point (a) of Part III of Annex I to Directive 
91/477/EEC simply refers to national legislation. The Protocol sets out more explicit general 
principles for the deactivation of weapons. Annex I to Directive 91/477/EEC should therefore 
be amended. 
(12) Due to the special nature of the activity of dealers, it is necessary that Member States 
exercise a strict control over this activity, in particular by verifying the professional integrity 
and abilities of dealers. 
(13) The acquisition of firearms by private individuals by means of distance communications, 
for example via the Internet should, where authorised, be subject to the rules laid down in 
Directive 91/477/EEC and, as a general rule, the acquisition of firearms by persons convicted 
by a final court judgment of certain serious criminal offences should be prohibited. 
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Comment: Initially this provision proposed, except with respect to dealers and brokers, a 
prohibition of acquisition of firearms through the means of distance communication, which 
do not allow appropriate control. Another suggested measure required an introduction of a 
cooling-off period between the moment when the client orders the firearm and that when the 
firearm is delivered, initially set up to 15 days. Such period, already put in practice in State of 
California, could decrease the crimes under temporary state of mental disorder.  
Present Recital 13 as well as amended Article 6 did not keep either a cooling-off period, or 
complete prohibition of the acquisition of firearms through the means of distance 
communication, albeit admitting that, where authorised, it should be strictly controlled. 
Therefore, this Directive does not provide any explicit rule on acquisition by means of 
distance communication (see also comment on Article 6).  
 
(14) The European firearms pass functions in a satisfactory way on the whole and should be 
regarded as the main document needed by hunters and marksmen for the possession of a 
firearm during a journey to another Member State. Member States should not make the 
acceptance of the European firearms pass conditional upon the payment of any fee or charge. 
Comment: This provision was added by the European Parliament that considered the 
European firearms pass (hereinafter referred to as EFP) to be the sole document required from 
hunters and marksmen. Such approach was also backed up by the majority of Member States. 
However, this statement was not implemented in this Directive (see also comment on Article 
12(2)). 
 
(15) In order to facilitate the tracing of firearms and efficiently to combat the illicit trafficking 
and manufacturing of firearms, their parts and ammunition, it is necessary to improve the 
exchange of information between Member States. 
(16) The processing of information is subject to compliance with Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [5] and 
does not prejudice the level of protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data under Community and national law, and in particular does not alter the 
obligations and rights set out in Directive 95/46/EC. 
(17) The measures necessary for the implementation of Directive 91/477/EEC should be 
adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the 
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission [6]. 
(18) Several Member States have simplified the way they classify firearms by switching from 
four categories to the following two: prohibited firearms and firearms subject to authorisation. 
Member States should fall into line with this simplified classification, although Member 
States which divide firearms into a further set of categories may, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, maintain their existing classification systems. 
(19) Authorisations for the acquisition and possession of firearms should, as far as possible, 
involve a single administrative procedure. 
(20) Article 2(2) of Directive 91/477/EEC among other things excludes from the scope of 
application of that Directive the acquisition or possession of weapons and ammunition in 
Preamble 
Page 68 of 229 
 
accordance with national law by collectors and bodies concerned with the cultural and 
historical aspects of weapons and recognised as such by the Member State in whose territory 
they are established. 
(21) In accordance with point 34 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making [7], 
Member States should draw up, for themselves and in the interests of the Community, their 
own tables illustrating, as far as possible, the correlation between this Directive and the 
transposition measures, and make them public. 
(22) Directive 91/477/EEC should therefore be amended accordingly, 
 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:  
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CHAPTER 1 Scope 
Article 1  
1. For the purposes of this Directive, "firearm" shall mean any portable barrelled weapon that 
expels, is designed to expel or may be converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the 
action of a combustible propellant, unless it is excluded for one of the reasons listed in Part III 
of Annex I. Firearms are classified in Part II of Annex I. 
Comment:  
The Protocol also contains a definition of firearms, according to Article 3(a) thereof “firearm 
shall mean any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily 
converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique 
firearms or their replicas. Antique firearms and their replicas shall be defined in accordance 
with domestic law. In no case, however, shall antique firearms include firearms manufactured 
after 1899”. 
Therefore, a definition of firearms, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC, aligns the EU 
legislation with provisions of the Protocol. Nevertheless, this definition excludes deactivated 
firearms; firearms designed for alarm, signalling, life-saving, animal slaughter or harpoon 
fishing or for industrial or technical purposes; and antique weapons, as it is mentioned in Part 
III of Annex I of this Directive. 
 
In general, Part II of Annex I of this Directive distinguishes four categories of firearms: 
   - Category A – prohibited firearms,  
   - Category B – firearms subject to authorisation,  
   - Category C – firearms subject to declaration, 
   - Category D – other firearms. 
Besides, some European deputies wanted to abolish the four-category differentiation of 
firearms, arguing that several Member States (i.e. Ireland) introduced merely two categories 
into their national legislations, such as forbidden firearms and firearms subject to 
authorisation.  
Nevertheless, according to Recital 18 of this Directive which is worded as follows: 
“Several Member States have simplified the way they classify firearms by switching from four 
categories to the following two: prohibited firearms and firearms subject to authorisation. 
Member States should fall into line with this simplified classification, although Member States 
which divide firearms into a further set of categories may, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, maintain their existing classification systems”.  
Member States are free to decide which classification to adopt. This provision is due to the 
respect of special features and traditions of Member States that stems from the principle of 
subsidiarity inherent in the European Union policies.  
 
It shall be noted that categories defined in Part II of Annex I of this Directive, notably the 
categories B, C and D could be included in the concept of ‘small arms and light weapons’ as 
defined by the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely 
and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons28, adopted by the UN General 
Assembly on December 8th, 2005.  
According to this document, ‘small arms and light weapons’ mean “any man-portable lethal 
weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted 
                                                
28  The full text of International Instrument is available on the following website:  
http://www.poa-iss.org/InternationalTracing/InternationalTracing.aspx.  
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to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique 
small arms and light weapons or their replicas. [] 
‘Small arms’ are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include, inter 
alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles 
and light machine guns.  
‘Light weapons’ are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two or three persons 
serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person. They include, 
inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand -held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, 
portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of 
anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti -aircraft missile systems, and 
mortars of a caliber of less than 100 millimetres.” 
For the purposes of this Directive, an object shall be considered as capable of being converted 
to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of a combustible propellant if: 
- it has the appearance of a firearm, and 
- as a result of its construction or the material from which it is made, it can be so 
converted. 
1a. For the purposes of this Directive, "part" shall mean any element or replacement element 
specifically designed for a firearm and essential to its operation, including a barrel, frame or 
receiver, slide or cylinder, bolt or breech block, and any device designed or adapted to 
diminish the sound caused by firing a firearm. 
1b. For the purposes of this Directive, "essential component" shall mean the breach-closing 
mechanism, the chamber and the barrel of a firearm which, being separate objects, are 
included in the category of the firearms on which they are or are intended to be mounted. 
Comment: Article 3(b) of the Protocol provides a common definition of “parts and 
components”. In order to preserve legal certainty aforesaid definition was used by this 
Directive to clarify the sole term “part”.  
 
1c. For the purposes of this Directive, "ammunition" shall mean the complete round or the 
components thereof, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder, bullets or 
projectiles, that are used in a firearm, provided that those components are themselves subject 
to authorisation in the relevant Member State. 
 
Comment: In order to preserve legal certainty the definition of term “ammunition” 
reproduces that used by Article 3(c) of the Protocol. 
1d. For the purposes of this Directive, "tracing" shall mean the systematic tracking of firearms 
and, where possible, their parts and ammunition from manufacturer to purchaser for the 
purpose of assisting the competent authorities of Member States in detecting, investigating 
and analysing illicit manufacturing and illicit trafficking. 
Comment: In order to preserve legal certainty this provision uses the definition of “tracing” 
provided by Article 3(f) of the Protocol. Besides, the notion of tracing of firearms, their parts 
and components is essential in a combat against illicit trafficking and manufacturing.  
1e. For the purposes of this Directive, "broker" shall mean any natural or legal person, other 
than a dealer, whose trade or business consists wholly or partly in the buying, selling or 
arranging the transfer of weapons. 
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Comment: The term “weapons” used in this provision deserves to be pointed out. The scope 
thereof is far too general; therefore it is difficult to understand which items shall be taken into 
account (i.e. firearms, ammunitions, parts). Nevertheless, this notion is specified in Annex I of 
this Directive: 
“I. For the purposes of this Directive, 'weapon' means:  
- any firearm as defined in Article 1 of the Directive, 
- weapons other than firearms as defined in national legislation”. 
 
It shall be noted that the transactions involving ammunitions and parts of firearms are 
excluded from de definition of brokering activities. 
As concerns the definition of “dealer”, the items concerned, namely firearms, parts and 
ammunition, are clearly mentioned by Article 1(2).  
The difference between “dealer” and “broker” stands essentially in fact that broker usually 
does not own nor get in touch with the goods he deals in. However, abovementioned 
difference is rather an empirical one and therefore it has no legal force with regard to the 
application of this Directive.  
2. For the purposes of this Directive, "dealer" shall mean any natural or legal person whose 
trade or business consists wholly or partly in the manufacture, trade, exchange, hiring out, 
repair or conversion of firearms, parts and ammunition. 
Comment: An addition of the reference to “parts and ammunition” results from accession 
of the EU to the Protocol. Such amendment was required for the purpose of enlargement of 
the scope of application of Directive to the control of parts of firearms and ammunition, 
which are defined respectively in the Articles 1b and 1c of this Directive. 
2a. For the purposes of this Directive, "illicit manufacturing" shall mean the manufacturing or 
assembly of firearms, their parts and ammunition: 
(i) from any essential component of such firearms illicitly trafficked; 
(ii) without an authorisation issued in accordance with Article 4 by a competent 
authority of the Member State where the manufacture or assembly takes place; or 
(iii) without marking the assembled firearms at the time of manufacture in accordance 
with Article 4(1). 
 
2b. For the purposes of this Directive, "illicit trafficking" shall mean the acquisition, sale, 
delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts or ammunition from or across the 
territory of one Member State to that of another Member State if any one of the Member 
States concerned does not authorise it in accordance with the terms of this Directive or if the 
assembled firearms are not marked in accordance with Article 4(1). 
 
Comment: Article 3(d) of the Protocol provides identical definition of “illicit trafficking”; 
however it also includes transactions concerning import and export. It should be kept in mind, 
that the scope of this Directive only covers activities related to the internal market. Therefore 
the notions of import, export and transfer used by the Protocol are restricted to transactions 
undertaken within the EU while leaving aside those involving third countries. 
 
3. For the purposes of this Directive, a person shall be deemed to be a resident of the country 
indicated by the address appearing on a document establishing his place of residence, such as 
a passport or an identity card, which, on a check on possession or on acquisition, is submitted 
to the authorities of a Member State or to a dealer.  
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4. A "European firearms pass" shall be issued on request by the authorities of a Member State 
to a person lawfully entering into possession of and using a firearm. It shall be valid for a 
maximum period of five years, which may be extended, and shall contain the information set 
out in Annex II. It shall be non-transferable and shall record the firearm or firearms possessed 
and used by the holder of the pass. It must always be in the possession of the person using the 
firearm and any change in the possession or characteristics of the firearm, as well as the loss 
or theft thereof, shall be indicated on the pass. 
 
Comment: Former Article 1(4) established a variable validity for European firearm pass 
according to the category of arms it made reference to. Whereas a common period of validity 
of pass was set up to a maximum of five years, the derogation stipulated “where only firearms 
classified in category D appear on the pass, the maximum period of validity thereof shall be 
ten years”.  
The standard of the EFP was established by the Commission in Recommendation 93/216/EEC 
of 25 February 1993, modified by Recommendation 96/129/EEC29 of 12 January 1996. All 
Member States have decided to adopt the model of the pass elaborated by the Commission.  
 
                                                
29  The Recommendation is available at the following website:  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/goods/docs/dir91477/recomcart_en.pdf 
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Article 2  
1. This Directive is without prejudice to the application of national provisions concerning the 
carrying of weapons, hunting or target shooting.  
 
Comment: In other words this Directive completes national legislations and does not intend 
to replace them.  
It should be noted that the main aim of this Directive is to harmonise the rules on acquisition 
and possession of firearms in the EU. In order to have a complete overview of this issue, 
national legislations of Member States should be examined.  
 
2. This Directive shall not apply to the acquisition or possession of weapons and ammunition, 
in accordance with national law, by the armed forces, the police, the public authorities or by 
collectors and bodies concerned with the cultural and historical aspects of weapons and 
recognized as such by the Member State in whose territory they are established. Nor shall it 
apply to commercial transfers of weapons and ammunition of war.  
 
Comment: As regards collectors and cultural and historical organisations, there is a necessity 
to underline an ambiguity of the term “antique weapons”.  
The Commission has proposed to use the provisions of the Schengen acquis, namely Article 
82 that gives criteria to recognise an antique weapon based on the date of fabrication. 
Therefore, all weapons fabricated prior to January 1st, 1870 shall be considered as antiques 
weapons.  
Nevertheless, this Article reserves the possibility for Member States to introduce exceptions at 
the national level. Several Member States has exercised this right, thereby introducing 
different interpretations in this area. The need of legal certainty constrained the European 
Parliament to propose several amendments in order to close this loophole by opting for the 
adoption of the definition of Article 82 of Schengen acquis. However this definition was 
revised defining “antique weapon” as “either any weapon manufactured before 1900, 
including replicas, or any newer weapon defined as an antique weapon by a Member State 
according to technical criteria”.  
None of those provisions was included in the draft of Directive 2008/51/EC. 
Member State Antique weapon specification 
Belgium Model of firearm shall be anterior to1890 and it shall de manufactured before 1945  
Denmark Firearms manufactured before 1870 
Ireland 
Weapons manufactured before 1845 which have an 
ignition system that does not utilise cased 
ammunition 
Italy Firearms manufactured before 1890 
Lithuania An arm made before the year 1870 
Poland An arm made before the year 1870  
Slovakia A model developed before December 31, 1890 
United Kingdom Firearms manufactured before 1st January 1st, 1919 
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Article 3  
Member States may adopt in their legislation provisions which are more stringent than those 
provided for in this Directive, subject to the rights conferred on residents of the Member 
States by Article 12 (2).  
 
Comment: This Directive essentially establishes the common elements to be implemented by 
Member States. Its main objective remains to harmonise national legislations governing the 
field of acquisition and possession of firearms within the EU borders even if Member States 
are free to adopt more restrictive provisions.  
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CHAPTER 2 Harmonization of legislation concerning firearms 
Article 4  
1. Member States shall ensure either that any firearm or part placed on the market has been 
marked and registered in compliance with this Directive, or that it has been deactivated. 
2. For the purpose of identifying and tracing each assembled firearm, Member States shall, at 
the time of manufacture of each firearm, either: 
(a) require a unique marking, including the name of the manufacturer, the country or 
place of manufacture, the serial number and the year of manufacture (if not part of the 
serial number). This shall be without prejudice to the affixing of the manufacturer’s 
trademark. For these purposes, the Member States may choose to apply the provisions 
of the Convention of 1 July 1969 on Reciprocal Recognition of Proofmarks on Small 
Arms; or 
 
Complementary information: Convention for the reciprocal recognition of proof marks 
on small arms, signed at Brussels on 1 July 196930: 
This Convention establishes the Permanent International Commission for the Proving of 
Small Arms, which is composed of representatives of all Contracting Parties. Each 
Contracting Party has one vote, whatever the number of its representatives. Following 
Member States have signed the Convention: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Slovak Republic, Spain and United Kingdom. 
 
Article I sets up following functions for of Permanent International Commission:  
“(1) To select apparatus to serve as a standard for shooting pressure measurements, and 
measuring procedures to be employed by the official services for accurate and practical 
determination of pressures developed by standard and proof cartridges, in respect of: 
(a) sporting, target and defensive arms, with the exception of arms for land, sea and air 
warfare; however, the Contracting Parties shall be entitled to use, for any or all of the latter 
arms, the measuring instruments and procedures adopted hereunder; 
(b) all other portable devices, arms or apparatus for industrial or occupational use not 
covered above which utilize an explosive charge to propel a projectile or mechanical parts of 
any kind, and the testing of which is deemed necessary by the Permanent International 
Commission. 
Such apparatus shall be termed "standard apparatus". 
(2) To determine the nature and manner of execution of the official tests to which the arms or 
apparatus specified in paragraph (1) (a) and (b) will be subjected, with a view to providing 
every guarantee of safety. 
Such tests shall be termed "standard tests". 
(3) To incorporate into the standard measurement apparatus and the operating procedures, 
as also into the standard tests, such improvements, modifications or additions as may be 
called for by advances in metrology or in the production of small arms and apparatus for 
industrial and occupational use and of ammunition therefor. 
(4) To promote the standardization of chamber dimensions of commercial fire-arms and the 
methods of inspection and testing of ammunition there for. 
(5) To examine the laws and regulations concerning the official testing of small arms enacted 
by the Contracting Governments with a view to ascertaining whether they are in conformity 
with the determinations made under paragraph (2) above. 
                                                
30  This Convention is available at the following website:  
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/23/3/00044110.pdf. 
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(6) To declare in which Contracting States the tests performed correspond to the standard 
tests under paragraph (2) and to issue a table of facsimiles of the proof marks employed by 
those States' official proof houses both currently and in the time since the signing of the 
Convention of 15 July 1914. 
(7) To withdraw the declaration provided for in paragraph (6) above and amend the said 
table should the conditions referred to in paragraph (6) cease to be fulfilled.” 
 
Article II stipulates that the proof marks of the official proof houses of each of the 
Contracting Parties shall be recognised in the territory of the other Contracting Parties 
provided prior declaration of the CIP. 
Decisions of the Permanent International Commission are taken by vote, provided that the 
number of votes constitutes at least two thirds of the total number of members of the 
Permanent International Commission. However, when the question of recognising of proof 
marks of a Contracting Party is being considered, the Party concerned shall not be entitled to 
vote. The decisions shall enter into force if within the six months following the notification 
accomplished by the Permanent Bureau none of the Contracting Parties submits an objection 
or reservations.  
 
(b) maintain any alternative unique user-friendly marking with a number or alphanumeric 
code, permitting ready identification by all States of the country of manufacture. 
 
Comment: This Directive does not opt for marking with geometric symbols, which is 
generally used in China and in several States of the former USSR. Therefore, such marking 
might only be understood by the country of manufacture. Hence, marking with alphabetic 
symbols was privileged for transfers implying EU Member States.  
 
The marking shall be affixed to an essential component of the firearm, the destruction of 
which would render the firearm unusable. 
Member States shall ensure that each elementary package of complete ammunition is marked 
so as to provide the name of the manufacturer, the identification batch (lot) number, the 
calibre and the type of ammunition. For these purposes Member States may choose to apply 
the provisions of the Convention of 1 July 1969 on Reciprocal Recognition of Proofmarks on 
Small Arms. 
Furthermore, Member States shall ensure, at the time of transfer of a firearm from 
government stocks to permanent civilian use, the appropriate unique marking permitting 
identification by States of the transferring country. 
 
3. Member States shall make the pursuit of the activity of dealer within their territory 
conditional upon authorisation on the basis of at least a check of the private and professional 
integrity and of the abilities of the dealer. In the case of a legal person, the check shall be on 
the person who directs the undertaking. 
 
Comment: This provision was amended several times. Initially a difference was made 
between the categories A and B, and the categories C and D. As concerns the categories A 
and B, the pursuit of the activity of dealer was submitted to authorisation. As concerns 
categories C and D, a declaration was required in order to proceed with the activity of dealer.  
Nevertheless, the European Parliament did not endorse this consideration. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the category in question, the pursuit of the activity of dealer has to be 
submitted to authorisation.  
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It is interesting to point that the European Parliament opted, in addition to verification of 
professional abilities of dealers and brokers, for an obligation to verify “the origin of their 
financial means”, grounding this requirement by specific nature of their activity as well as by 
need of proper regulation thereof. 
However, the term “check of the private and professional integrity and of the abilities of the 
dealer” might engender various and not always compatible interpretations. Therefore the 
implementation of this provision in national legislations deserves to be carefully analysed in 
order to grasp the meaning given to it by Member States. 
 
It should be noted, that initially this provision concerned also the activity of broker, since the 
Commission wanted to enclose brokering activities, as mentioned in Article 15 “Brokers and 
brokering” of the Protocol, within the definition of “dealer” given by this Directive31. 
Consequently brokering activities had to be regulated similarly as these of dealers. 
Nevertheless, this proposal was not endorsed; therefore brokering activities are regulated 
separately by Article 4b of this Directive. 
 
4. Member States shall, by 31 December 2014, ensure the establishment and maintenance of a 
computerised data-filing system, either a centralised system or a decentralised system which 
guarantees to authorised authorities access to the data-filing systems in which each firearm 
subject to this Directive shall be recorded. This filing system shall record and maintain for not 
less than 20 years each firearm’s type, make, model, calibre and serial number, as well as the 
names and addresses of the supplier and the person acquiring or possessing the firearm. 
 
Comment: Article 7 of the Protocol also constrains State Parties with guarantee of 
maintenance, for not less than 10 years, of information in relation to: 
  -  firearms,  
  -  their parts and components where appropriate and feasible, 
  -  ammunition that is necessary to their tracing and identification. 
 
This Directive appears to be stricter as regards the duration of maintain of information. 
Justification of extension of the period of maintenance of information up to 20 years is 
partially due to the dangerous nature and longevity of weapons. By integrating this provision 
the Commission believed to decrease a likelihood of the diversion of weapons for criminal 
intentions as well as to provide the proper tracing of firearms.  
Mentioned data-filling system is accessible by the police and judicial authorities responsible 
for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. 
The processing of the information cannot prejudice rights relative to either the protection of 
individuals granted by Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data32, or the level of protection provided by Community and national law.  
Article 12 of the Protocol requires States Parties to exchange relevant case-specific 
information on for example authorised producers, dealers, importers, exporters and, whenever 
possible, carriers of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. 
                                                
31  See 27th Amendment of draft European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive 
amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A6-2007-
0276+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
32  OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31 as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003 (OJ L 284, 31.10.2003, 
p. 1). 
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Throughout their period of activity, dealers shall be required to maintain a register in which 
all firearms subject to this Directive and which are received or disposed of by them shall be 
recorded, together with such particulars as enable the firearm to be identified and traced, in 
particular the type, make, model, calibre and serial number thereof and the names and 
addresses of the persons supplying and acquiring it. Upon the cessation of his activities, the 
dealer shall deliver the register to the national authority responsible for the filing system 
provided for in subparagraph 1. 
 
5. Member States shall ensure that all firearms may be linked to their owner at any moment. 
However, as regards firearms classified in category D, Member States shall, as from 28 July 
2010, put into place appropriate tracing measures, including, as from 31 December 2014, 
measures enabling linking at any moment to the owner of firearms placed on the market after 
28 July 2010. 
 
Comment: It shall be noted that previously Member States were bounded to make the pursuit 
of the activity of dealer conditional upon: 
   - an authorisation, at least with respect to categories A and B;  
   - a declaration with respect of categories C and D. 
Presently, Member States are urged to require an authorisation for pursuit of the activity of 
dealer for all categories of firearms subject to this Directive. 
 
In addition, former provision required each dealer to keep a register with inventory of all 
firearms classified in categories A, B or C. Period of conservation of such register was set up 
to 5 years.  
Presently, the register is required for all categories of firearms thereby category D is also 
referred. Moreover, the information recorded shall be maintained for not less than 20 years, 
which increases considerably the period of preservation of information.  
 
It should be noted, that initially this provision also concerned the activity of broker, since the 
Commission wanted to enclose brokering activities, as mentioned in Article 15 “Brokers and 
brokering” of the Protocol, within the definition of dealer given by the Directive33. 
Consequently brokering activities had to be regulated similarly as those of dealers. 
Nevertheless, this proposal was not endorsed; therefore brokering activities are regulated 
separately by Article 4b of this Directive, as amended.  
 
Article 4a 
Without prejudice to Article 3, Member States shall allow the acquisition and possession of 
firearms only by persons who have been granted a licence or, with respect to categories C or 
D, who are specifically permitted to acquire and possess such firearms in accordance with 
national law. 
 
Comment: it shall be noted that several Member States have decided to introduce more than 
two categories regarding licences for acquisition and possession of firearms. Thus Slovakia 
and Czech Republic established a distinction for firearms permits according to the purpose for 
which the firearm or ammunition is to be used. 
As concerns Slovakia following groups were set up: 
A – carrying a firearm and ammunition in order to protect a person and property, 
                                                
33  See 28th Amendment of draft European Parliament legislative resolution, op.cit.   
Article 4 
Page 79 of 85 
 
B – keeping a firearm and ammunition in order to protect a person and property, 
C – keeping a firearm and ammunition in order to carry out one’s employment or 
authorisation according to a special regulation, 
D – keeping a firearm and ammunition for hunting purposes, 
E – keeping a firearm and ammunition for sports purposes, 
F – keeping a firearm and ammunition for museum or collector’s purposes. 
 
As concerns Czech Republic provided groups are:  
A – collectors’ purposes, 
B – sports purposes, 
C – hunting purposes, 
D – pursuing a profession or occupation,  
E – protecting life, health or property, or 
F – activities in the field of unexploded ordnance.  
 
The groups provided by both States are rather similar, however the corresponding categories 
differ which can eventually result in legal uncertainty. 
 
Article 4b 
Member States shall consider establishing a system for the regulation of the activities of 
brokers. Such a system might include one or more measures such as: 
(a) requiring the registration of brokers operating within their territory; 
(b) requiring the licensing or authorisation of the activity of brokering.; 
 
Comment: It shall be noted that measures stated in points (a) and (b) are those proposed by 
Article 15 of the Protocol, which in addition includes a point (c) worded as follows: 
“Requiring disclosure on import and export licenses or authorizations, or accompanying 
documents, of the names and locations of brokers involved in the transaction”.  
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Article 5  
Without prejudice to Article 3, Member States shall permit the acquisition and possession of 
firearms only by persons who have good cause and who: 
(a) are at least 18 years of age, except in relation to the acquisition, other than through 
purchase, and possession of firearms for hunting and target shooting, provided that in 
that case persons of less than 18 years of age have parental permission, or are under 
parental guidance or the guidance of an adult with a valid firearms or hunting licence, 
or are within a licensed or otherwise approved training centre; 
(b) are not likely to be a danger to themselves, to public order or to public safety. Having 
been convicted of a violent intentional crime shall be considered as indicative of such 
danger. 
 
Comment: This Article strongly bounds acquisition and possession of firearms by minors for 
hunting and target shooting: 
  -  The exception for minors as concerns firearms for hunting and target shooting  
     was bounded by the requirement of parental permission or specific guidance (Article 5(a)), 
  -  The notion “be a danger to themselves, to public order or to public safety” was specified  
     (Article 5(a)).  
It should be noted that former wording of this Article concerned only firearms classified in 
Category B (firearms subject to authorisation). Consequently the rules on acquisitions and 
possession of firearms classified in Categories C and D has been reinforced.  
 
Member States may withdraw authorisation for possession of a firearm if any of the 
conditions on the basis of which it was granted are no longer satisfied. 
Member States may not prohibit persons resident within their territory from possessing a 
weapon acquired in another Member State unless they prohibit the acquisition of the same 
weapon within their own territory. 
 
Article 6  
Member States shall take all appropriate steps to prohibit the acquisition and the possession of 
the firearms and ammunition classified in category A. In special cases, the competent 
authorities may grant authorizations for such firearms and ammunition where this is not 
contrary to public security or public order.  
 
Comment: Firearms and ammunitions listed in category A constitute a minimum requirement 
as concerns the firearms that shall be prohibited. According to Article 8(3) of this Directive, 
Member States can extend this list by adding other items, which they consider as enough 
dangerous to be prohibited for individual acquisition and the possession. Therefore, there is 
no common list of prohibited firearms taking into account that the one proposed by this 
Directive can be amended by 27 Member States.  
 
Member States shall ensure that, except with respect to dealers, the acquisition of firearms 
and their parts and ammunition by means of distance communication, as defined in Article 2 
of Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts[], shall, where authorised, be strictly 
controlled. 
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Complementary information: Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts34 
Bearing in mind that the new technologies are increasing the number of ways for consumers 
to view bids anywhere in the EU and to place orders, Directive 97/7/EC offers the minimum 
scope of measures to be taken by Member States in order to protect the consumers with regard 
to distance contracts.  
 
Article 2 provides the definition of “means of distance communication” which are 
characterised as follows “any means which, without the simultaneous physical presence of the 
supplier and the consumer, may be used for the conclusion of a contract between those 
parties”. Annex I contains an indicative list of means covered by Directive 97/7/EC which 
includes: 
  -  Unaddressed printed matter, 
  -  Addressed printed matter, 
  -  Standard letter, 
  -  Press advertising with order form, 
  -  Catalogue, 
  -  Telephone with human intervention, 
  -  Telephone without human intervention (automatic calling machine, audiotext), 
  -  Radio, 
  -  Videophone (telephone with screen), 
  -  Videotex (microcomputer and television screen) with keyboard or touch screen, 
  -  Electronic mail, 
  -  Facsimile machine (fax), 
  -  Television (teleshopping). 
 
Article 3 establishes a list of exemptions, notably the cases where Directive 97/7/EC shall not 
be applied, inter alia, cases:  
  -  related to financial services, a non-exhaustive list of which is given in Annex II, 
  -  concluded by means of automatic vending machines or automated commercial premises, 
  -  concluded with telecommunications operators through the use of public payphones, 
  -  concluded for the construction and sale of immovable property or relating to other  
     immovable property rights, except for rental, 
  -  concluded at an auction. 
 
Article 10 introduces a set of restrictions on the use of certain means of distance 
communication. Thereby, only providing prior consent of the consumer, a supplier can use an 
automated calling system without human intervention or a facsimile machine. Member States 
shall ensure that means of distance communication which allow individual communications 
may be used only where there is no clear objection from the consumer. 
 
Article 7  
1. No one may acquire a firearm classified in category B within the territory of a Member 
State unless that Member State has so authorized him.  
No such authorization may be given to a resident of another Member State without the latter's 
prior agreement.  
 
                                                
34  OJ L 144, 4.6.1997, p. 19.  
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2. No one may be in possession of a firearm classified in category B within the territory of a 
Member State unless that Member State has so authorized him. If he is a resident of another 
Member State, that other Member State shall be informed accordingly. 
 3. An authorization to acquire and an authorization to possess a firearm classified in category 
B may take the form of a single administrative decision.  
 
4. Member States may consider granting persons who satisfy the conditions for the granting of 
an authorisation for a firearm a multiannual licence for the acquisition and possession of all 
firearms subject to authorisation, without prejudice to: 
(a) the obligation to notify the competent authorities of transfers; 
(b) the periodic verification that those persons continue to satisfy the conditions; and 
(c) the maximum limits for possession laid down in national law. 
 
5. Member States shall adopt rules to ensure that persons holding authorisations for firearms 
of category B in force under national law as at 28 July 2008 do not need to apply for a licence 
or permit regarding firearms they hold in categories C or D due to the entry into force of 
Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 []. 
However, any subsequent transfer of firearms of categories C or D shall be subject to the 
transferee obtaining or having a licence or being specifically permitted to possess those 
firearms in accordance with national law. 
 
Article 8, 9, 10 
Page 83 of 85 
 
Article 8  
1. No one may be in possession of a firearm classified in category C unless he has declared it 
to the authorities of the Member State in which that firearm is held.  
The Member States shall provide for the compulsory declaration of all firearms classified in 
category C at present held within their territories but not previously declared within one year 
of the entry into force of the national provisions transposing this Directive.  
 
2. Every seller, dealer or private person shall inform the authorities of the Member State in 
which it takes place of every transfer or handing over of a firearm classified in category C, 
giving the particulars by which the firearm and the person acquiring it may be identified. If 
the person acquiring such a firearm is a resident of another Member State, that other Member 
State shall be informed of the acquisition by the Member State in which it took place and by 
the person acquiring the firearm.  
 
3. If a Member State prohibits or makes subject to authorization the acquisition and 
possession within its territory of a firearm classified in category B, C or D, it shall so inform 
the other Member States, which shall expressly include a statement to that effect on any 
European firearms pass they issue for such a firearm, pursuant to Article 12 (2).  
 
Article 9  
1. The handing over of a firearm classified in category A, B or C to a person who is not 
resident in the Member State in question shall be permitted, subject to compliance with the 
obligations laid down in Articles 6, 7 and 8:  
- where the person acquiring it has been authorized in accordance with Article 11 himself to 
effect a transfer to his country of residence,  
- where the person acquiring it submits a written declaration testifying to and justifying his 
intention to be in possession of the firearm in the Member State of acquisition, provided that 
he fulfils the legal conditions for possession in that Member State.  
2. Member States may authorize the temporary handing over of firearms in accordance with 
procedures which they shall lay down.  
 
Article 10  
The arrangements for the acquisition and possession of ammunition shall be the same as those 
for the possession of the firearms for which the ammunition is intended.  
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CHAPTER 3 Formalities for the movement of weapons within the Community 
Article 11  
Authorisation Content Reference 
Individual Transfer 
authorisation  
Granted to persons undertaking transfers of firearms 
between Member States. Possible for all categories of 
firearms listed in Annex I of this Directive.  
If authorisation is granted, a licence shall accompany 
the firearm during transportation thereof and shall be 




Granted to a dealer undertaking transfers of firearms 
to a dealer established in another Member State. 
Possible for all categories of firearms listed in Annex 
I of this Directive. An authorisation is granted for 
maximum period of three years. It shall accompany 
the firearm during transportation thereof and shall be 




Granted to persons travelling through two or more 
Member States. Such authorisation shall appear on 





Granted to persons travelling through two or more 
Member States. Such authorisation is valid for more 
than one journey for a maximum period of one year. 





Exclusively applicable to categories C and D.  
No authorisation required if: 
- Journey with a view of engaging in hunting  
  activities; 
- Possession of a European firearms pass; 
- Capability to substantiate the reasons for the  
  journey (i.e. invitation, other proof).  
N.B. Authorisation is required if Member State 
prohibits/makes subject to authorisation the 





Exclusively applicable to categories B, C and D.  
No authorisation required if: 
- Journey with a view of engaging in target  
  shooting activities; 
- Possession of a European firearms pass; 
- Capability to substantiate the reasons for the  
  journey (i.e. invitation, other proof).  
N.B. Authorisation is required if Member State 
prohibits/makes subject to authorisation the 
acquisition and possession of the firearm in question.  
Article 12(2), 
paragraph 1 
1. Firearms may, without prejudice to Article 12, be transferred from one Member State to 
another only in accordance with the procedure laid down in the following paragraphs. These 
provisions shall also apply to transfers of firearms following a mail order sale.  
 
2. Where a firearm is to be transferred to another Member State, the person concerned shall, 
before it is taken there, supply the following particulars to the Member State in which such 
firearm is situated:  
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- the names and addresses of the person selling or disposing of the firearm and of the 
person purchasing or acquiring it or, where appropriate, of the owner,  
- the address to which the firearm is to be consigned or transported,  
- the number of firearms to be consigned or transported,  
- the particulars enabling the firearm to be identified and also an indication that the 
firearm has undergone a check in accordance with the Convention of 1 July 1969 on 
the Reciprocal Recognition of Proofmarks on Small Arms,  
- the means of transfer,  
- the date of departure and the estimated date of arrival.  
The information referred to in the last two indents need not be supplied where the transfer 
takes place between dealers.  
The Member State shall examine the conditions under which the transfer is to be carried out, 
in particular with regard to security.  
Where the Member State authorizes such transfer, it shall issue a licence incorporating all the 
particulars referred to in the first subparagraph. Such licence shall accompany the firearm 
until it reaches its destination; it shall be produced whenever so required by the authorities of 
the Member States.  
 
3. In the case of transfer of the firearms, other than weapons of war, excluded from the scope 
of this Directive pursuant to Article 2 (2), each Member State may grant dealers the right to 
effect transfers of firearms from its territory to a dealer established in another Member State 
without the prior authorization referred to in paragraph 2. To that end it shall issue an 
authorization valid for no more than three years, which may at any time be suspended or 
cancelled by reasoned decision. A document referring to that authorization must accompany 
the firearm until it reaches its destination; it must be produced whenever so required by the 
authorities of the Member States.  
 
Prior to the date of transfer, the dealer shall communicate to the authorities of the Member 
State from which the transfer is to be effected all the particulars listed in the first 
subparagraph of paragraph 2. Those authorities shall carry out inspections, where appropriate 
on the spot, to verify the correspondence between the information communicated by the 
dealer and the actual characteristics of the transfer. The information shall be communicated 
by the dealer within a period allowing sufficient time. 
 
Comment: It shall be noted that during amendment procedure, the European Parliament 
opted for the delay of 5 days available to a dealer to communicate all necessary information. 
Nevertheless, this requirement was not endorsed by this Directive.    
 
4. Each Member State shall supply the other Member States with a list of firearms the transfer 
of which to its territory may not be authorized without its prior consent.  
Such lists of firearms shall be communicated to dealers who have obtained approval for 
transferring firearms without prior authorization under the procedure laid down in paragraph 
3. 
Comment: This provision introduces derogation to the main principle on this Directive, 
namely the possibility for Member States to issue an authorisation for export of firearms from 
their territory.  
Indeed, Article 11(4) allows a Member State to establish a list of firearms that shall obtain an 
authorisation thereof before being transferred to its territory. This is the sole possibility 
provided by this Directive, which gives to Member States a right to issue a so-called “import 
authorisation”.  
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Article 12  
1. If the procedure provided for in Article 11 is not employed, the possession of a firearm 
during a journey through two or more Member States shall not be permitted unless the person 
concerned has obtained the authorization of each of those Member States.  
Member States may grant such authorization for one or more journeys for a maximum period 
of one year, subject to renewal. Such authorizations shall be entered on the European firearms 
pass, which the traveller must produce whenever so required by the authorities of the Member 
States.  
 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, hunters, in respect of categories C and D, and marksmen, in 
respect of categories B, C and D, may, without prior authorisation, be in possession of one or 
more firearms during a journey through two or more Member States with a view to engaging 
in their activities, provided that they are in possession of a European firearms pass listing such 
firearm or firearms and provided that they are able to substantiate the reasons for their 
journey, in particular by producing an invitation or other proof of their hunting or target 
shooting activities in the Member State of destination. 
Member States may not make acceptance of a European firearms pass conditional upon the 
payment of any fee or charge. 
 
Comment: This Directive introduces a facilitation regarding a possession of firearms, but it 
should be emphasised that this exception is conditional upon several elements such as: 
  -  A profession of the possessor,  
  -  A category of firearm under his possession,  
  -  Activities to undertake,  
  -  A territory of undertaking.  
It should be kept in mind that this Directive covers only journeys within the EU. It does not 
regulate the conditions of firearm holding in the Member State where the possessor is 
resident. 
 
Besides, amended Article 12(2) enlarges the set of documents to be produced by hunters and 
marksmen in order to substantiate the reasons for their journey by amplifying that the “other 
proof of their hunting or target shooting activities in the Member State of destination” can be 
accepted. Whereas, the former provision stipulated that only an invitation had to be produced 
(see also comment relative to Recital 14). 
 
However, this derogation shall not apply to journeys to a Member State which prohibits the 
acquisition and possession of the firearm in question or which, pursuant to Article 8 (3), 
makes it subject to authorization; in that case, an express statement to that effect shall be 
entered on the European firearms pass.  
 
Comment: This disposition limits the derogation as concerns hunters and marksmen who do 
not need a prior authorisation for firearms they possess while travelling with a view to 
engaging in their activities. Indeed, they will have to obtain an authorisation for those 
firearms, which other Member States unilaterally included in their national lists of prohibited 
firearms or these subject to authorisation.  
Taking into account the Member States’ right to modify firearms categories via their national 
legislations, it could be concluded that there is no EU common list of firearms. 
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In the context of the report referred to in Article 17, the Commission in consultation with the 
Member States, will also consider the effects of applying the second subparagraph, 
particularly as regards its impact on public order and public security.  
 
3. Under agreements for the mutual recognition of national documents, two or more Member 
States may provide for arrangements more flexible than those prescribed in this Article for 
movement with firearms within their territories.  
 
 
Article 13  
1. Each Member State shall communicate all useful information at its disposal concerning 
definitive transfers of firearms to the Member State to the territory of which such a transfer 
has been effected.  
 
2. All information that Member States receive by way of the procedures laid down in Article 
11 for transfers of firearms and in Article 7 (2) and Article 8 (2) for the acquisition and 
possession of firearms by non-residents shall be communicated, not later than the time of the 
relevant transfers, to the Member States of destination and, where appropriate, not later than 
the time of transfer to the Member States of transit.  
 
3. For the purposes of the efficient application of this Directive, Member States shall 
exchange information on a regular basis. To this end, the Commission shall set up, by 28 July 
2009, a contact group for the exchange of information for the purposes of applying this 
Article. Member States shall inform each other and the Commission of the national authorities 
responsible for transmitting and receiving information and for complying with the obligations 
set out in Article 11(4). 
 
Comment: A number of articles focus on the relevance of information exchange, namely 
4(4), 7(2), 8(2), 8(3), 11(4) 13, 15(3), 15(4), and 18. Thus former Article 13(3) required 
Member States to establish, by 1 January 1993 at the latest, networks for the exchange of 
information for the purposes of applying this Article.  
 
Apparently these networks were not satisfactory; therefore amended version of Article 13(3) 
requires the Commission to set up a contact group for the purpose of information exchange. 
This group was effectively established, i.e. E02211 Group of contact (exchange of 
information) for application of the new Directive 2008/51/CE.  
This consideration indicates the willingness of the Commission to create a discussion forum 
with larger degree of effectiveness, which will act as co-ordination framework for the 
application, and the enforcement of this Directive. The contact group will act as a place where 
specific proposals for improving the exchange of information would be examined in order to 
find solutions for difficulties issued from the application of this Directive35.  
 
Article 13a 
1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. 
                                                
35  The list of authorities competent for communicating information can be consulted on 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/goods/docs/dir91477/contact_points_directive_91-477-eec.doc.  
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2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Articles 5 and 7 of Council Decision 
1999/468/EC36 of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing 
powers conferred on the Commission [] shall apply, having regard to the provisions of Article 
8 thereof. 
The period laid down in Article 5(6) of Decision 1999/468/EC shall be set at three months. 
 
 
Article 14  
Member States shall adopt all relevant provisions prohibiting entry into their territory:  
- of a firearm except in the cases defined in Articles 11 and 12 and provided the conditions 
laid down therein are met,  
- of a weapon other than a firearm provided that the national provisions of the Member State 
in question so permit.  
 
                                                
36  Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission is available at the following website:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31999D0468:EN:HTML,  
amended by Council Decision 2006/512/EC of 17 July 2006:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:200:0011:01:EN:HTML. 
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CHAPTER 4 Final provisions 
Article 15  
1. Member States shall intensify controls on the possession of weapons at external 
Community frontiers. They shall in particular ensure that travellers from third countries who 
intend to proceed to another Member State comply with Article 12.  
 
2. This Directive shall not preclude the carrying out of controls by Member States or by the 
carrier at the time of boarding of a means of transport.  
 
3. Member States shall inform the Commission of the manner in which the controls referred 
to in paragraphs 1 and 2 are carried out. The Commission shall collate this information and 
make it available to all Member States.  
 
4. Member States shall notify the Commission of their national provisions, including changes 
relating to the acquisition and possession of weapons, where the national law is more stringent 
than the minimum standard they are required to adopt. The Commission shall pass on such 
information to the other Member States.  
 
Article 16  
Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the 
national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all measures necessary to 
ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive. 
 
Comment: Former Article 16 required Member States to introduce sufficient penalties for 
failure to comply with the provisions adopted in accordance with this Directive.  
Article 16 does not use the term “penalties” but the one of “rules on penalties”, which should 
be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” 
It shall be noted that Commission’s initial proposition required Member States to set up as 
criminal offences the following conduct, provided that it was committed intentionally:  
“  –  illicit manufacturing of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition;  
   –  illicit trafficking of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition;  
   –  falsifying or illicitly obliterating, removing or altering the markings on firearms required 
by Article 4(1).  
     Such attempts, or participation as an accomplice in the latter shall also be considered as 
criminal offences, when committed intentionally.   
     These offences shall be punishable by a confiscation measure as provided for in Article 2 
of Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the Confiscation of 
Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property”.  
The European Parliament tried to modify 1st paragraph of Article 16, by adding a following 
subparagraph: “The failure to carry a European firearms pass shall not be subject to custodial 
sentences”. This provision aimed at protecting persons being lawfully in possession of 
weapon from eventual incarceration if they cannot present an EFP providing that they possess 
all necessary documents.  
It shall be emphasised that this provision concerned, in particular, the travellers to the United 
Kingdom who should provide the original of their EFP six to eight weeks in advance, thereby 
permitting the local police to make all necessary procedures.  
None of those provisions appears in Directive 2008/51/EC.  
Nevertheless, the issue of establishment of sanctions for the infringement of European law 
remains sensitive. The main discord concerns the distribution of competences; in particular it 
Article 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 
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remains uncertain whether the establishment of sanctions constitutes a national competence or 
that of the EU.  
 
Article 17  
The Commission shall, by 28 July 2015, submit a report to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the situation resulting from the application of this Directive, accompanied, if 
appropriate, by proposals. 
The Commission shall, by 28 July 2012, carry out research and submit a report to the 
European Parliament and the Council on the possible advantages and disadvantages of a 
reduction to two categories of firearms (prohibited or authorised) with a view to the better 
functioning of the internal market for the products in question by means of possible 
simplification. 
The Commission shall, by 28 July 2010, submit a report to the European Parliament and the 
Council presenting the conclusions of a study of the issue of the placing on the market of 
replica firearms in order to determine whether the inclusion of such products within the scope 
of this Directive is possible and desirable. 
 
Comment: It shall be emphasised that former Article 17 bounded the Commission with an 
obligation to submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council concerning the 
situation resulting from the application of this Directive. Such report was submitted on 
December 15th, 2000. 
This Report concerns 15 States members of the European Union including Austria, Finland 
and Sweden that joined the EU during the Fourth enlargement thereof on 1 January 199537.  
 
Article 18  
1. Member States shall, by 28 July 2010, bring into force the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall forthwith 
communicate to the Commission the text of those measures. 
When Member States adopt those measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or 
be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member 
States shall determine how such references are to be made. 
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of 
national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.  
Comment: List of references to the national measures adopted by 15 Member States as 
concerns the implementation of Directive 91/411/ EEC is included in Annex I of the Report of 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 15 December 2000 (see 








                                                
37  This Report is available at: 
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2000/com2000_0837en01.pdf.  
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Article 19  
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. Done at Strasbourg, 21 May 2008. 
 
For the European Parliament 
The President 
        H.-G. PÖTTERING 
 
For the Council 
  The President 









I. For the purposes of this Directive, 'weapon' means:  
- any firearm as defined in Article 1 of the Directive, 
- weapons other than firearms as defined in national legislation.  
 
II. For the purposes of this Directive, 'firearm' means:  
A. Any object which falls into one of the following categories, unless it meets the definition 
but is excluded for one of the reasons listed in section III.  
 
Category A - Prohibited firearms  
1. Explosive military missiles and launchers.  
2. Automatic firearms.  
3. Firearms disguised as other objects.  
4. Ammunition with penetrating, explosive or incendiary projectiles, and the projectiles for 
such ammunition.  
5. Pistol and revolver ammunition with expanding projectiles and the projectiles for such 
ammunition, except in the case of weapons for hunting or for target shooting, for persons 
entitled to use them.  
 
Category B - Firearms subject to authorization  
1. Semi-automatic or repeating short firearms.  
2. Single-shot short firearms with centre-fire percussion.  
3. Single-shot short firearms with rimfire percussion whose overall length is less than 28 cm.  
4. Semi-automatic long firearms whose magazine and chamber can together hold more than 
three rounds.  
5. Semi-automatic long firearms whose magazine and chamber cannot together hold more 
than three rounds, where the loading device is removable or where it is not certain that the 
weapon cannot be converted, with ordinary tools, into a weapon whose magazine and 
chamber can together hold more than three rounds.  
6. Repeating and semi-automatic long firearms with smooth-bore barrels not exceeding 60 cm 
in length.  
7. Semi-automatic firearms for civilian use which resemble weapons with automatic 
mechanisms.  
 
Category C - Firearms subject to declaration  
1. Repeating long firearms other than those listed in category B, point 6.  
2. Long firearms with single-shot rifled barrels.  
3. Semi-automatic long firearms other than those in category B, points 4 to 7.  
4. Single-shot short firearms with rimfire percussion whose overall length is not less than 28 
cm.  
 
Category D - Other firearms  
Single-shot long firearms with smooth-bore barrels.  
B. Any essential component of such firearms:  
The breach-closing mechanism, the chamber and the barrel of a firearm which, being separate 
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III. For the purposes of this Annex objects which correspond to the definition of a 'firearm' 
shall not be included in that definition if they:  
(a) have been rendered permanently unfit for use by deactivation, ensuring that all essential 
parts of the firearm have been rendered permanently inoperable and incapable of removal, 
replacement or a modification that would permit the firearm to be reactivated in any way; 
 
Comment: Former point (a) did not use the term “deactivation” but that of “application of 
technical procedures” which had to be guaranteed or recognised by an official body. 
Current point (a) introduces the procedure of deactivation that concerns not only a firearm as 
a whole but also its essential parts, which should be also rendered permanently inoperable and 
incapable of removal, replacement or a modification. 
 
(b) are designed for alarm, signalling, life-saving, animal slaughter or harpoon fishing or for 
industrial or technical purposes provided that they can be used for the stated purpose only;  
(c) are regarded as antique weapons or reproductions of such where these have not been 
included in the previous categories and are subject to national laws.  
 
Member States shall make arrangements for the deactivation measures referred to in point (a) 
to be verified by a competent authority in order to ensure that the modifications made to a 
firearm render it irreversibly inoperable. Member States shall, in the context of this 
verification, provide for the issuance of a certificate or record attesting to the deactivation of 
the firearm or the apposition of a clearly visible mark to that effect on the firearm. The 
Commission shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 13a (2) of 
the Directive, issue common guidelines on deactivation standards and techniques to ensure 
that deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable. 
 
Comment: Article 9 of the Protocol determines the general principles of deactivation that 
include following: 
  “(a) All essential parts of a deactivated firearm are to be rendered permanently inoperable 
and incapable of removal, replacement or modification in a manner that would permit the 
firearm to be reactivated in any way; 
    (b) Arrangements are to be made for deactivation measures to be verified, where 
appropriate, by a competent authority to ensure that the modifications made to a firearm 
render it permanently inoperable; 
    (d) Verification by a competent authority is to include a certificate or record attesting to 
the deactivation of the firearm or a clearly visible mark to that effect stamped on the firearm.” 
Pending coordination throughout the Community, Member States may apply their national 
laws to the firearms listed in this Section.  
 
IV. For the purposes of this Annex:  
(a) 'short firearm' means a firearm with a barrel not exceeding 30 centimetres or whose 
overall length does not exceed 60 centimetres;  
(b) 'long firearm' means any firearm other than a short firearm;  
(c) 'automatic firearm' means a firearm which reloads automatically each time a round is 
fired and can fire more than one round with one pull on the trigger;  
(d) 'semi-automatic firearm' means a firearm which reloads automatically each time a 
round is fired and can fire only one round with one pull on the trigger;  
ANNEX I 
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(e) 'repeating firearm' means a firearm which after a round has been fired is designed to 
be reloaded from a magazine or cylinder by means of a manually-operated action;  
(f) 'single-shot firearm' means a firearm with no magazine which is loaded before each 
shot by the manual insertion of a round into the chamber or a loading recess at the 
breech of the barrel;  
(g) 'ammunition with penetrating projectiles' means ammunition for military use where 
the projectile is jacketed and has a penetrating hard core;  
(h) 'ammunition with explosive projectiles' means ammunition for military use where the 
projectile contains a charge which explodes on impact;  
(i) 'ammunition with incendiary projectiles' means ammunition for military use where the 
projectile contains a chemical mixture which bursts into flame on contact with the air 
or on impact.  
ANNEX II 




EUROPEAN FIREARMS PASS 
 
The pass must include the following sections:  
 
(a) identity of the holder;  
(b) identification of the weapon or firearm, including a reference to the category within 
the meaning of the Directive;  
(c) period of validity of the pass;  
(d) section for use by the Member State issuing the pass (type and references of 
authorizations, etc.);  
(e) section for entries by other Member States (authorizations to enter their territory, etc.);  
(f) the statements:  
 
'The right to travel to another Member State with one or more of the firearms in categories B, 
C or D mentioned in this pass shall be subject to one or more prior corresponding 
authorizations from the Member State visited. This or these authorizations may be recorded 
on the pass.  
 
The prior authorization referred to above is not in principle necessary in order to travel with a 
firearm in categories C or D with a view to engaging in hunting or with a firearm in categories 
B, C or D for the purpose of taking part in target shooting, on condition that the traveller is in 
possession of the firearms pass and can establish the reason for the journey.'  
 
Where a Member State has informed the other Member States, in accordance with Article 8 
(3), that the possession of certain firearms in categories B, C or D is prohibited or subject to 
authorization, one of the following statements shall be added:  
 
'A journey to . . . (State(s) concerned) with the firearm . . . (identification) shall be prohibited.'  
'A journey to . . . (State(s) concerned) with the firearm . . . (identification) shall be subject to 
authorization.'  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
